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Abstract
We introduce the notion of hybrid trapdoor commitment schemes. Intuitively a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme is a
primitive which can be either an unconditionally binding commitment scheme or a trapdoor commitment scheme depending on the
distribution of commitment parameters. Moreover, such two possible distributions are computationally indistinguishable. Hybrid
trapdoor commitments are related but different with respect to mixed commitments (introduced by Damga˚rd and Nielsen at Crypto
2002). In particular hybrid trapdoor commitments can either be polynomially trapdoor commitments or unconditionally binding
commitments, while mixed commitments can be either trapdoor commitments or extractable commitments. In this paper we show
that strong notions (e.g., simulation sound, multi-trapdoor) of hybrid trapdoor commitments admit constructions based on the sole
assumption that one-way functions exist as well as efficient constructions based on standard number-theoretic assumptions. To
further stress the difference between hybrid and mixed commitments, we remark here that mixed commitments seem to require
stronger theoretical assumptions (and the known number-theoretic constructions are less efficient). Our main result, is to show how
to construct concurrent and simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof systems (in contrast to the arguments recently presented in
[I. Damga˚rd, Efficient concurrent zero-knowledge in the auxiliary string model, in: Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’00, in:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807, Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 418–430; P. MacKenzie, K. Yang, On simulation-sound
trapdoor commitments, in: Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt’04, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3027, Springer-
Verlag, 2004, pp. 382–400; R. Gennaro, Multi-trapdoor commitments and their applications to proofs of knowledge secure under
concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks, in: Advances in Cryptology — Crypto’04, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
3152, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 220–236]) in the common reference string model. We crucially use hybrid trapdoor commitments
since we present general constructions based on the sole assumption that one-way functions exist and very efficient constructions
based on number-theoretic assumptions.
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1. Introduction
Commitment schemes are arguably among the most important and useful primitives in cryptography. Intuitively a
commitment scheme can be seen as the digital equivalent of a sealed envelope. If a party A wants to commit to some
message m she just puts it into the sealed envelope, so that whenever A wants to reveal the message, she opens the
envelope. Clearly, such a mechanism can be useful only if it meets some basic requirements. First of all the digital
envelope should hide the message: no party other than A should be able to learn m from the commitment (this is often
referred in the literature as the hiding property). Second, the digital envelope should be binding, meaning with this
that A can not change her mind about m, and by checking the opening of the commitment one can verify that the
obtained value is actually the one A had in mind originally (this is often referred to as the binding property). These
two properties make commitments very useful in a wide range of cryptographic applications such as zero-knowledge
protocols, multi-party computation, digital auctions and electronic commerce.
A commitment scheme is a primitive to generate and open commitments. More precisely a commitment scheme is
a two-phase protocol between two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms sender and receiver. In a first stage
(called the commitment phase) sender commits to a message m using some appropriate function Com which takes
as input m and some auxiliary value r and produces as output a value c. The value c is sent to receiver as a
commitment on m. In the second stage (called the decommitment phase) sender “convinces” receiver that c is
actually a valid commitment on m (if receiver is not convinced, it just outputs some special string). A commitment
scheme with this form is called non-interactive since both stages require only one message from sender to receiver.
The requirements that we make on a commitment scheme are the following ones. First, if both sender and receiver
behave honestly, then at the end of the decommitment phase receiver is convinced that sender had committed to
bit m with probability 1. This is often referred to as the correctness requirement. Second a cheating receiver can
not guess m with respect to any other legal message m′ with probability significantly better than 1/2. This is the
so-called hiding property. Finally, a cheating sender should be able to open a commitment (i.e., to decommit) with
both m and m′ 6= m only with very small (i.e., negligible) probability (this is the binding property). Each of the last
two properties (i.e., hiding and binding) can be satisfied unconditionally or relatively to a computational assumption.
In our context (i.e., where only two parties are involved) this immediately implies that one can not hope to build a
commitment scheme where both the hiding and the binding properties hold unconditionally. Unconditionally binding
commitment schemes have been constructed under the sole assumption that one-way functions exist [57] and in that
construction an initial message of the receiver is required. It is known how to construct non-interactive unconditionally
binding commitment schemes by using any one-to-one one-way function [6]. In [4], the authors show how to
construct non-interactive commitments based on one-way functions and derandomization techniques. Constant-round
unconditionally hiding commitment schemes have been constructed under the assumption that collections of claw-
free functions [46] or collision resistant hash functions [51] exist. Recently in [50] it is shown how to construct
unconditionally hiding commitment schemes from any regular one-way function, but unfortunately, these schemes
are not constant round.
Since commitment schemes are very useful primitives they are often used as building blocks to construct larger
protocols. In this sense it is often the case that the two basic requirements described above turn out to be insufficient.
For this reason commitment schemes with additional properties have been proposed. Here we highlight some of these
constructions, others, more directly related to our results, will be discussed in the next section.
A trapdoor commitment scheme (sometimes also called chameleon commitment), is a commitment scheme with
an associated pair of public and private keys (the latter also called the trapdoor). Knowledge of the trapdoor allows
the sender to open the commitment in more than one way (this is often referred to as the equivocality property).
On the other hand, without knowledge of the trapdoor, equivocality remains computationally infeasible. When the
commitments computed by means of a trapdoor are distributed exactly as real commitments then the trapdoor
commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding. Trapdoor commitments have been shown to exist under the assumption
that one-way functions exist [38].
A commitment scheme is said to be non-malleable if – very informally – given a commitment c on some message
m, knowledge of c does not help another party in constructing a new commitment c′ of a message m′ related to
m. Such a property is referred to as non-malleability with respect to commitment and is studied for unconditionally
binding commitment schemes. Another different property is non-malleability with respect to opening. In this case, c′
is a commitment that once c is opened to m, can be opened to a value m′ related to m. Non-malleable commitments
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with respect to commitment have been defined in [34], and the first constant-round construction in the plain model
has been given in [2] for the stand-alone case (i.e., the protocol is interactive and has to be executed in isolation,
concurrency is not allowed). Non-interactive non-malleable commitments with respect to opening have been originally
constructed in [31,40,32]. Such constructions have been recently improved in [26] where once the commitment
parameters have been established (by a trusted third party), it is possible to compute any polynomial number of
non-malleable commitments.
An extractable commitment (also known as commitment scheme with extractability) is a commitment scheme
where we allow the existence of a secret key whose knowledge permits us to extract the message stored in the
commitment. At the same time, without knowledge of the secret key, the message remains (computationally) hidden.
Finally a universally composable commitment is a commitment scheme with the very useful property that –
informally – even if one concurrently composes it with any other protocol, the security of the commitment scheme
is preserved. Universal composability is a very strong notion, which, for the case of commitment schemes, seems to
require concurrent non-malleability and extractability.
The first construction of a universally composable commitment scheme has been presented in [14] and it has been
later improved in [16,28] and in [26].
1.1. Other notions of commitments
Simulation-sound trapdoor commitments. Garay et al. [42] introduced the notion of simulation-sound trapdoor
commitments (SSTCs, for short) which was later relaxed by MacKenzie and Yang in [55]. In a nutshell an SSTC
scheme is a trapdoor commitment scheme that associates a label called a tag to each commitment. An adversary of
an SSTC scheme can not equivocate a commitment with a certain tag, even after seeing a polynomial number of
equivocations for commitments with different tags.
In [42] SSTCs are used to construct efficient universally composable zero-knowledge arguments that remain secure
even when facing adaptive adversaries (i.e., adversaries which are allowed to adaptively corrupt parties involved in
the protocol). In [55] is presented a simpler – and slightly weaker – definition of SSTC and the authors prove that
the resulting primitive is actually equivalent to secure signatures [49]. The notion of SSTC introduced in [55], being
weaker with respect to the one in [42] allows one to construct more efficient number-theoretic implementations.
Interestingly, this weaker notion still remains sufficient to construct many applications (such as simulation-sound
zero-knowledge argument systems).
Multi-trapdoor commitments. The notion of a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme was introduced by
Gennaro [44]. A multi-trapdoor commitment scheme is a family of trapdoor commitments such that each scheme
in the family is a trapdoor commitment scheme. The main feature of multi-trapdoor commitments is that they admit a
master trapdoor whose knowledge allows one to equivocate for any commitment scheme in the family. Furthermore
every commitment in the family admits also its own local trapdoor. However knowledge of the local trapdoor for
a given scheme does not allow one to equivocate on another scheme of the family (unless of course the master
trapdoor is available). In [44], Gennaro presents two very efficient constructions (based on the strong RSA and on
the strong Diffie–Hellman assumptions respectively) as well as several applications. The main application of multi-
trapdoor commitments is the construction of left-concurrent non-malleable arguments of knowledge. Here the left-
concurrent non-malleable setting is a model in which the adversary can play in a polynomial number of sessions the
role of verifier while in one session he plays the role of prover. As already pointed out in [55], a left-concurrent non-
malleable argument of knowledge is actually an unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge argument system. We
stress that the multi-trapdoor commitments presented in [44] allows for simulation-sound zero-knowledge argument
systems that are more efficient than the ones presented in [55]. The definition of multi-trapdoor commitments given
in [44] requires unconditional hiding. This property is obviously enjoyed by both implementations of multi-trapdoor
commitments given in [44]. However, in the applications given in [44], unconditional hiding is not used. Since even
our applications will only use computational hiding, we will focus in both the definitions and the constructions on
multi-trapdoor commitments that are computationally hiding.
We finally notice that in [44] multi-trapdoor commitments were constructed under number-theoretic assumptions
only.
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Mixed commitments. In [28] Damga˚rd and Nielsen introduced the notion of mixed commitments. Informally, a
mixed commitment scheme can be either a trapdoor commitment scheme or an extractable commitment scheme, the
exact nature depends on the distribution according to which the public key is generated. If the public key is composed
by some specific keys (referred to as E-keys) then the scheme is an unconditionally hiding trapdoor commitment
scheme. If instead the public key is composed by some other specific keys (referred to as X -keys) then the scheme
is an unconditionally binding and extractable commitment scheme. Of course no key can be both an E-key and an
X -key. A crucial property of mixed commitment schemes is that no polynomially bounded adversary (not having
access to secret keys or trapdoors corresponding to the public key) should be able to distinguish E-keys from X -keys.
In [28] some efficient implementations have been derived from Damga˚rd–Jurik’s [27] variant of the Paillier [60]
cryptosystem and from the Okamoto–Uchiyama [59] cryptosystem. Moreover the authors showed how to use mixed
commitments to build universally composable commitments with the constraint that the size of the public key
depends on the number of players. More recently Damga˚rd and Groth [26] improved this construction by proposing
a universally composable commitment scheme based on the strong RSA assumption, that can work with a reference
string whose size does not depend on the number of players involved in the protocol. This result is achieved by
combining a non-malleable commitment scheme with mixed commitments.
1.2. Our contributions
In this paper we introduce the notion of a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme. Informally a hybrid trapdoor
commitment scheme is a general commitment primitive with commitment parameter generation algorithms HGen
and HTGen. If the commitment parameters are obtained as the output of HGen then the resulting scheme is an
unconditionally binding commitment scheme, while if the parameters are generated by HTGen the produced scheme is
actually a trapdoor commitment scheme. Moreover, as for mixed commitments, no polynomially bounded adversary,
taking as input only the (public) commitment parameters, should be able to tell the difference between keys generated
from HGen and keys produced by HTGen.
Notice that the notion of hybrid trapdoor commitment may look very similar to that of mixed commitment. There
is a crucial difference however. Depending on the way the parameters are generated a mixed commitment can be
either an extractable commitment or a trapdoor commitment. In our case, on the other hand, we require only that the
commitment is either unconditionally binding or a trapdoor commitment scheme.
As mentioned before, mixed commitments have been introduced to construct universally composable commitments
and indeed Damga˚rd and Nielsen proved that it is possible to construct a universally composable commitment from
a mixed commitment where the number of E-keys over the total number of keys is negligible and that the number
of X -keys over the total number of keys is almost 1. Interestingly, a recent result by Damga˚rd and Groth [26] shows
that universally composable commitments imply key exchange and, when implemented in the shared random string
model, they imply oblivious transfer. Therefore it seems unlikely that universally composable commitments can be
implemented from one-way functions only.
In this paper, on the other hand, we show that hybrid trapdoor commitments can be constructed from any one-way
function.
To improve on efficiency we then turn our attention to specific number-theoretic constructions and we propose three
different implementations. The first one is very efficient and relies on the Decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. The
remaining two are based on Paillier’s [60] Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA for brevity) and
build on previous constructions by Catalano et al. [18] and Bresson et al. [12]. Interestingly the DCRA-based solutions
enjoy the extractability property and turn out to be mixed commitment schemes. In particular our first DCRA-based
solution is very efficient and it is actually slightly more efficient than the two implementations proposed by Damga˚rd
and Nielsen [28]. Our construction of hybrid trapdoor commitments that are based on the Diffie–Hellman assumption
is much more efficient than the known constructions of mixed commitments.
Stronger extensions. We study some stronger extensions of hybrid trapdoor commitments. In particular we show
how to build hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitments and hybrid multi-trapdoor commitments from the sole
assumption that one-way functions exist. Moreover, we present some practical implementations based on number-
theoretic assumptions.
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In this paper we show that multi-trapdoor commitment schemes are actually equivalent to digital signatures which
are secure with respect to generic chosen message attack. Informally in a generic chosen message attack the adversary
can obtain signatures only on a list of messages chosen before the public key of the signer is published. This is clearly a
weaker notion with respect to the standard one where the adversary is allowed to choose the messages adaptively. Since
SSTCs are actually equivalent to standard secure signatures, from a practical point of view, our result further clarifies
why the known (practical) implementations of multi-trapdoor commitments are more efficient than the corresponding
implementations of SSTC.
Techniques. The construction of a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme consists in producing a scheme that is a
trapdoor commitment scheme for some commitment parameters while it is an unconditionally binding commitment
scheme for other commitment parameters. We stress that the two distributions of the commitment parameters are
indistinguishable. Once we achieve this result, we combine the basic hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme with a tag-
based simulation-sound trapdoor (resp., multi-trapdoor) commitment scheme. This is based on a parallel execution
of the two commitment schemes, thus obtaining a hybrid tag-based simulation-sound trapdoor (resp., multi-trapdoor)
commitment scheme. We finally stress that the results of [26] actually achieve hybrid trapdoor commitments based on
one-way functions only, even though this is not explicitly formalized and claimed in their work.
Applications. The main contribution of this paper is to show how to use the different variants of hybrid trapdoor
commitments to achieve the following results.
1. Using hybrid trapdoor commitments we show how to construct three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof
systems, in the shared random string model, for all NP languages. We give a construction based on the existence
of any one-way function and an efficient construction that is based on the DDH assumption. These results improve
the computational soundness achieved in a previous result by Damga˚rd [29] in the sense that ours are actually
zero-knowledge proofs rather than zero-knowledge arguments.
2. Using either hybrid SSTC or hybrid multi-trapdoor commitments we show how to construct an unbounded
simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof system in the common reference string model. This improves the recent
results of [55,44] where similar results were presented for unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge arguments
(rather than proofs).
Comparison with other previous results. One of the techniques that we use in the constructions for hybrid trapdoor
commitments is that of having two different algorithms for generating the reference string. The former outputs
an “honest” reference string (i.e., a reference string that does not contain any trapdoor), while the latter outputs
a fake reference string along with the corresponding trapdoor. The distributions of the two reference strings are
indistinguishable. This technique was first introduced in [8] for achieving non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
The same technique has been used in [30] for achieving non-malleable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs under
the assumption that trapdoor permutations exist. Both proof systems crucially use an NP-reduction by following the
FLS-paradigm [37]. In this paper we basically show that this same technique can be used to construct (1) three-round
simulation-sound zero knowledge proofs under the sole assumption that one-way functions exist; (2) very efficient
three-round simulation-sound zero knowledge proofs under standard number-theoretic assumptions.
The first non-interactive non-malleable commitment based on one-way functions was previously presented in [31]
but there the adversary can only see one commitment computed on a given reference string. In [16] it is shown that
the trapdoor commitment scheme based on Hamiltonian graphs of [38] allows the adversary to see any polynomial
number of commitments before computing the mauled one. We stress that our contribution shows that hybrid trapdoor
commitments are commitments secure even against computationally unbounded adversarial committers and that admit
very efficient constructions based on number-theoretic assumptions and constructions based on the sole assumption
that one-way functions exist.
Proofs versus arguments. A proof system has the following property: any adversarial prover (regardless of his
computing power) has negligible probability of making an honest verifier accept a false statement. This strong
notion of soundness differs from the corresponding notion of soundness of an argument system, where security for
honest verifiers holds only against polynomial-time adversarial provers. The notions of argument and proof differ
dramatically when zero knowledge is considered. For example, while it is known that any NP language has a
perfect zero-knowledge argument [11], if an NP-complete language has a perfect zero-knowledge proof then the
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polynomial hierarchy collapses to its second level [41,10]. With respect to constant-round zero knowledge, the current
state of knowledge gives us a constant-round (computational) zero-knowledge proof for NP under the assumption
that collections of claw-free functions or collision-resistant hash functions exist [46,51], while constant-round zero-
knowledge arguments for NP are known to exist under the assumption that one-way functions exist [5].
As discussed above, in this paper we show that our new notion of commitment scheme can be used to obtain some
strong variants of zero-knowledge proof systems.
2. Definitions
We now give some basic definitions that we will use in this paper. We use the notation {β1, . . . , βk : α} to specify
the probability distribution of α after the sequential executions of events β1, . . . , βk . In general, we assume that an
algorithm A has access to some random (auxiliary) input even though this is not explicitly specified. Moreover, if A
is a probabilistic algorithm we denote by A(x) the random variable describing the output of A on input x . We say that
a function ν is negligible iff for all constants c there exists n0 such that for all n > n0 it holds that 0 ≤ ν(n) < 1/nc.
A binary relation R is polynomially bounded if it is decidable in polynomial time and there exists a polynomial
p such that for all pairs (x, w) ∈ R it holds that |w| ≤ p(|x |). We denote by L R = {x |∃y : (x, w) ∈ R} the
NP-language associated with R.
For anNP-language L we denote by RL the witness relation associated with L defined as x ∈ L ⇔ ∃w : (x, w) ∈
RL .
Definition 2.1. A function f : {0, 1}?→ {0, 1}? is called one way if the following conditions hold:
1. there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A such that on input x , A outputs f (x);
2. for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA′ there exists a negligible function ν such that for
all sufficiently large k, it holds that
Pr
(
x ← {0, 1}k;A′( f (x)) ∈ f −1( f (x))
)
< ν(k).
We now give definitions for several notions of commitment schemes. For readability we will use “for all m” to
mean any possible message m of length polynomial in the security parameter. We start with the standard notion of
commitment scheme with its two main variants (i.e., unconditionally binding and unconditionally hiding). Note that
all definitions will use a commitment generator function that outputs the commitment parameters. Therefore, such
commitments have a straightforward implementation in the common reference string model where a trusted third
party generates a reference string that is later received as common input by all parties. In some cases the commitment
parameters generated by the commitment generator function will be strings with uniform distribution; in such cases
the corresponding commitments can be implemented in the shared random string model which is a set-up assumption
weaker than the common reference string model.
Definition 2.2. (Gen, Com, Ver) is a commitment scheme (CS, for short) if:
– efficiency: Gen, Com and Ver are polynomial-time algorithms;
– completeness: for all m it holds that
Prob
(
crs← Gen(1k); (com, dec)← Com(crs,m) : Ver(crs, com, dec,m) = 1
)
= 1;
– binding: for any polynomial-time algorithm sender there is a negligible function ν such that for all sufficiently
large k it holds that
Prob
(
crs← Gen(1k); (com,m0,m1, dec0, dec1)← sender(crs) :
m0 6= m1 and Ver(crs, com, dec0,m0) = Ver(crs, com, dec1,m1) = 1
)
≤ ν(k);
– hiding: for any adversary receiver there is a negligible function ν such that for all m0,m1 where |m0| = |m1|
and all sufficiently large k it holds that
Prob
(
crs← Gen(1k); b← {0, 1}; (com, dec)← Com(crs,mb) : b← receiver(com)
)
<
1
2
+ ν(k).
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If the binding property holds with respect to a computationally unbounded algorithm sender, the commitment
scheme is said to be unconditionally binding; if instead, the hiding property holds with respect to a computationally
unbounded algorithm receiver, the commitment scheme is said to be unconditionally hiding.
We now give the definition of a trapdoor commitment scheme. In particular we strengthen the computational
indistinguishability of the computed commitments so that it holds even if the distinguisher takes as input the trapdoor
information. This allows one to use the same commitment parameters for any polynomial number of commitments
(and actually all our results hold in this stronger setting).
Definition 2.3. (Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a trapdoor commitment scheme (TCS, for short) if Gen(1k) outputs
a pair (crs, aux), Gencrs is the related algorithm that restricts the output of Gen to the first element crs,
(Gencrs, Com, Ver) is a commitment scheme and TCom and TDec are polynomial-time algorithms such that:
– trapdoorness: for all m the probability distributions:
{(com, dec)← Com(crs,m) : (crs, com, dec,m)} and
{(com′, auxcom′)← TCom(crs, aux); dec′← TDec(auxcom′ ,m) : (crs, com′, dec′,m)}
are computationally indistinguishable to any adversary that knows aux.
In the next theorem we show that the existence of one-way functions is sufficient for constructing trapdoor
commitment schemes under the above definition.
Theorem 2.4. Under the assumption that one-way functions exist, there exists a trapdoor commitment scheme.
Proof. Let f be a one-way function. Consider the commitment scheme proposed by Naor (see Appendix B for a
discussion about Naor’s commitment scheme), an instance (Gen, Com, Ver) of such a commitment scheme can be
constructed by using f . We now construct the following trapdoor commitment scheme (Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver).
Algorithm Gen produces a random string crs that can be interpreted as crs = setup ◦ com1 (where ◦ denotes
concatenation). Here setup denotes the first message of Naor’s commitment scheme and com1 is computed as a
commitment of the string 1k . The second output of Gen is the decommitment aux corresponding to the commitment
com1.
Algorithm Com on input crs and a message m runs the simulator S of Blum’s Σ -protocol (again see Appendix B
for more details about Σ protocols and an implementation of Blum’s Σ -protocol based on the existence of one-way
functions only) for proving that (setup, com1) is a commitment of string 1k . In particular S runs on input (setup,m)
to obtain an accepting transcript (setup, a,m, z). The output of Com is the pair (com = a, dec = z).
Algorithm Ver simply verifies that (setup, com,m, z) is an accepting transcript for the statement “(setup, com1)
is a commitment of the string 1k”.
Algorithm TCom, on input (crs, aux) computes a valid first message a for Blum’s Σ -protocol for proving that
(setup, com1) is a commitment of the string 1k . TCom outputs a and auxa = crs ◦ aux ◦ aux′ where aux′ is the
auxiliary information generated by the prover algorithm of Blum’s Σ -protocol when the first message a is computed.
Algorithm TDec on input auxa and a string m, runs the prover algorithm of Blum’s Σ -protocol on input the
transcript (setup, a,m) to obtain the last message z such that (setup, a,m, z) is an accepting transcript. TDec can
run the prover algorithm since he can pick from auxa both the decommitment aux corresponding to com1 (i.e., the
witness for the statement) and the auxiliary information aux′ corresponding to a. The output of TDec is dec = z.
(Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a trapdoor CS. First notice that the scheme is (computationally) binding. Indeed if
there exists an algorithm sender that manages to open a commitment in two different ways, by running the extractor
algorithm of Blum’s Σ -protocol one can obtain a cycle in the graph and then a witness for the statement “com is a
commitment of the string 1k”. Thus, the existence of such a sender would lead to breaking the hiding property of
Naor’s commitment scheme.
Next, knowing a cycle in the graph (or, equivalently, knowing a witness for the given statement) one can efficiently
compute a valid decommitment dec = z for any commitment a and any string m. Such a triple (a,m, z) obtained
using algorithms TCom and TDec is computationally indistinguishable from a triple (a′,m, z′) computed by using
Com even to a distinguisher that knows the trapdoor, i.e., the cycle in the graph. Indeed, by the honest-verifier zero-
knowledge property of Blum’sΣ -protocol the only difference is in the pair (a, a′). This is because, the first message of
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Blum’s Σ -protocol contains commitments to graphs. In fact, the message a computed by the honest prover algorithm
corresponds to commitments of randomly permuted graphs, some of them are opened to show the original graphs,
other are opened to show Hamiltonian cycles in the randomly permuted graphs, the remaining commitments are never
opened. The message a′ computed by the simulator corresponds in part to commitments of permuted graphs that
are opened to show the original graphs, in part to commitments of randomly chosen Hamiltonian cycles that are
opened to show the Hamiltonian cycles and in part by commitments that are never opened. Since in both a and a′
the commitments are computed using Naor’s commitment scheme, the only difference is in the commitments that are
never opened. Therefore, any distinguisher (even on input the trapdoor) would allow one to break (with a polynomially
related probability) the hiding property of the commitment scheme used in the first round of Blum’sΣ -protocol (which
in our case, is Naor’s commitment scheme).
We now discuss the case in which the distinguisher is allowed to query any polynomial number l of commitments
and decommitments and it is challenged to distinguish the case in which commitments are honestly computed and
opened from the opposite case in which commitments are computed and opened by means of the trapdoor. Using a
standard hybrid argument we show that if A is a (polynomially bounded) adversary succeeding in the above task,
then one can build an adversary B out of it that violates the trapdoorness property of the underlying commitment
scheme. Such a B receives on input the public parameters (together with the trapdoor) corresponding to some trapdoor
commitment scheme. We remark that B is allowed access to a challenging oracle O that, first outputs crs and aux and
then, when asked on input m outputs a challenge (com, dec) that is sampled using either Com or TCom, TDec according
to some random and secret bit b (wlog we assume that b = 0 means that the challenge is produced using TCom, TDec).
B works as follows: first it obtains crs and aux from O , then it chooses an index j uniformly and at random in the
range {1, . . . , l}. Next, whenever A on input crs asks its i-th query, for some message mi , B answers in the following
way:
if i < j it computes a commitment and a decommitment of mi using Com, and hands the resulting values to A;
if i > j it computes a commitment and a decommitment of mi using TCom, TDec, and hands the resulting values to
A;
if i = j it queries O on input m j and hands the obtained challenge (com, dec) to A.
At some point A may output a bit d . In particular we can assume that A outputs 1 if it thinks that all the
commitments were created using Com and 0 if it thinks that all of the commitments are fake ones. B simply outputs
the same d as its own guess.
Let us denote by Gk the scenario where the first k queries are answered using Com while the remaining l−k queries
are answered using TCom, TDec. We denote by Pk the probability that A wins when running in scenario Gk . Clearly,
one has that the advantage µA of A in succeeding in its guess is µA = |P0 − Pl |. The probability µB that B correctly
guesses b, on the other hand, is given by
µB = Pr[B → b′|b = b′] = 1l
∣∣∣∣∣ l∑
k=1
Pk −
l∑
k=1
Pk−1
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1l µA
thus concluding our proof. 
The definitions of commitment and trapdoor commitment schemes presented above can be extended by adding one
more input to algorithms Com, Ver and TCom that is, a label referred to as “tag”. In this case, algorithm Ver has an
additional constraint, it outputs 1 only if the same tag has been used as input by algorithms Com or TCom. In particular,
we will use such a tag-based definition of commitment when we consider the notion of a simulation-sound trapdoor
commitment.
Now we define multi-trapdoor commitment schemes.
Definition 2.5. (Gen, Sel, Tkg, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme (MTCS, for short)
if:
– efficiency: Gen, Sel, Tkg, Com, TCom, TDec and Ver are polynomial-time algorithms;
– completeness: for all m it holds that
Prob((PK, TK)← Gen(1k); pk← Sel(PK); (com, dec)← Com(pk,m) : Ver(pk, com, dec,m) = 1) = 1;
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– multi-trapdoorness (implies hiding): for all (PK, TK) generated with non-zero probability by Gen(1k), for all pk
where pk← Sel(PK), for all m the following probability distributions
{(com, dec)← Com(pk,m) : (pk, com, dec,m)}
{tk← Tkg(TK, pk); (com′, aux)← TCom(tk); dec′← TDec(aux,m) : (pk, com′, dec′,m)}
are computationally indistinguishable to any adversary knowing TK.
– binding: there is a negligible function ν such that for all m0 6= m1 and any pair of polynomial-time algorithms
(sender0, sender1) it holds that
Prob((p˜k = {pk1, . . . , pkk}, aux)← sender0(1k); (PK, TK)← Gen(1k);
(pk, com,m0,m1, dec0, dec1)← senderOPK1 (PK, aux) : pk 6∈ p˜k ∧
Ver(pk, com, dec0,m0) = Ver(pk, com, dec1,m1) = 1) ≤ ν(k)
where OPK operates as follows:
– On input (pk ∈ p˜k): compute (c˜om, ξ) ← TCom(tk), where tk = Tkg(TK, pk), store (c˜om, pk, ξ) and output
c˜om.
– On input (c˜om,m): if for some pk and some ξ , a tuple (c˜om, pk, ξ) is stored, compute d˜ec← TDec(ξ,m) and
output d˜ec.
Note that an efficient algorithm OPK can be implemented using the master trapdoor.
Remark 2.6. Notice that our definition of multi-trapdoor commitments is slightly different with respect to the one
given by Gennaro in [43]. First of all, we allow the possibility of using a trapdoor even during the commitment phase
(as done in the definition of SSTC given in [55]). One can easily verify that the construction given in [44] remains
sound with respect to the new definition as well.
Our definition also assumes that the hiding property holds only with respect to polynomially bounded adversaries
(while in the original definition the scheme is required to be unconditionally hiding). This (more general) definition
allows us to construct multi-trapdoor commitments from any one-way function (see Theorem 3.3). On the other hand it
seems unlikely that unconditionally hiding trapdoor commitment schemes can be constructed from one-way functions
(and even from trapdoor permutations [39]). Moreover, we point out here, that for all our applications it is sufficient
to consider multi-trapdoor commitment schemes which are hiding only in a computational sense.
Finally we assume wlog that a local public key also contains the master public key.
Now we define simulation-sound trapdoor commitment schemes which are based on the notion of tag-based
commitment schemes briefly discussed above.
Definition 2.7. (Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a tag-based Simulation-Sound trapdoor commitment scheme (SSTCS,
for short) if:
– (Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a tag-based trapdoor commitment scheme;
– Simulation-Sound Binding: for any polynomial-time algorithm sender there is a negligible function ν such that
Prob
(
(crs, aux)← Gen(1k); (com, tag,m0,m1, dec0, dec1)← senderOcrs (crs) : (m0 6= m1)∧
Ver(crs, com, dec0,m0, tag) = Ver(crs, com, dec1,m1, tag) = 1 ∧ tag 6∈ Q) ≤ ν(k),
where Ocrs operates as follows:
– On input (tag): compute (c˜om, ξ)← TCom(aux, tag), add tag to Q, store (c˜om, tag, ξ), and output c˜om.
– On input (c˜om,m): if for some tag and some c˜om, a tuple (c˜om, tag, ξ) is stored, compute d˜ec← TDec(ξ,m)
and output d˜ec.
Again, an efficient algorithm Ocrs can be implemented by using the auxiliary information generated along with
crs.
A brief review of the main tools used in our constructions is given in Appendix B.
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2.1. Hybrid trapdoor commitments: Definitions
Now we are ready to introduce the notion of a hybrid trapdoor commitment. As sketched in the introduction, such
a notion considers the existence of two commitment generation functions whose public outputs are computationally
indistinguishable. Still the properties of the two resulting commitment schemes are very different. We start with the
basic notion of a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
Definition 2.8. (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme (HTCS, for
short) if:
– binding: (HGen, HCom, HVer) is an unconditionally binding commitment scheme;
– trapdoorness: (HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a trapdoor commitment scheme.
– hybridness: let HTGen′ be an algorithm that restricts the output (crs, aux) of HTGen(1k) to crs, then the
following probability distributions are computationally indistinguishable: {crs0 ← HGen(1k) : crs0} and
{crs1← HTGen′(1k) : crs1}.
The notion given above can be extended to be a tag-based commitment scheme (as for the case of standard trapdoor
commitment schemes).
We now define the notions of hybrid multi-trapdoor and hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitment schemes.
We stress that for the latter we focus on tag-based commitments (obtained by adding a label – the tag – as input to the
algorithms that compute and verify commitments).
Intuitively, since multi-trapdoor and simulation-sound trapdoor commitment schemes define families of trapdoor
commitment schemes, for the hybrid variant of such primitives, we require that each scheme in the family is a hybrid
trapdoor commitment scheme.
Definition 2.9. (HGen, HTGen, HSel, HTkg, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment
scheme (HMTCS, for short) if:
– multi-trapdoorness: (HTGen, HSel, HTkg, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme;
– hybridness: let HGen′(1k) be an algorithm that runs HGen(1k) obtaining (crs, aux), runs HSel(crs) obtaining
pk and then outputs pk; moreover let HTGen′ be an algorithm that runs HTGen(1k) obtaining (crs′, aux′),
runs HSel(crs′) obtaining pk, runs HTkg(aux′, pk) obtaining tk and then outputs (pk, tk); then it holds that
(HGen′, HTGen′, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
Definition 2.10. (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitment
scheme (HSSTCS, for short) if:
– simulation soundness: (HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme;
– hybridness: (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
3. Hybrid trapdoor commitments: Constructions
We now show that hybrid trapdoor commitment schemes exist with respect to all the variants defined in Section 2.1.
In particular, for each definition, we show both a construction based on general primitives and a practical construction
based on number-theoretic assumptions.
We start with a construction for a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
Theorem 3.1. Under the assumption that one-way functions exist, there exists a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
Proof. Let f be a one-way function. Consider the commitment scheme proposed by Naor (see Appendix B
for a discussion about Naor’s commitment scheme), an instance (Gen, Com, Ver) of such a commitment scheme
can be constructed by using f . We now construct the following hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme HTCS =
(HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer).
Algorithm HGen produces a random string crs that can be interpreted as crs = setup ◦ com0 (where ◦ denotes
concatenation). Here setup denotes the first message of Naor’s commitment scheme and com0 is a random string.
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Notice that since Naor’s commitments are pseudorandom com0 corresponds to a valid commitment to 1k only with
negligible probability (this follows from the properties of Naor’s commitment scheme).
Algorithms HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer correspond to algorithms Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver defined in
the proof of Theorem 2.4. We report here again their descriptions by adding some comments that are useful for this
proof.
Algorithm HCom on input crs and a message m runs the simulator S of Blum’s Σ -protocol (again see Appendix B
for more details about Σ protocols and an implementation of Blum’s Σ -protocol based on the existence of one-way
functions only) for proving that (setup, com0) is a commitment of string 1k (which is with overwhelming probability
a false statement). In particular S runs on input (setup,m) to obtain an accepting transcript (setup, a,m, z). The
output of HCom is the pair (com = a, dec = z).
Algorithm HVer simply verifies that (setup, com,m, z) is an accepting transcript for the statement “(setup, com0)
is a commitment of the string 1k”.
Algorithm HTGen outputs a string crs = setup ◦ com1 precisely as HGen, the only difference is that com1 is
computed as a commitment of the string 1k . The second output of HTGen is the decommitment aux corresponding
to the commitment com1. Notice that, assuming that Naor’s commitment scheme is computationally hiding, the
distribution of the crs generated by HTGen, is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the crs
generated by HGen (which is a random string).
Algorithm HTCom, on input (crs, aux) computes a valid first message a for Blum’s Σ -protocol for proving that
(setup, com1) is a commitment of the string 1k (which in this case is a true statement). HTCom outputs a and
auxa = crs ◦ aux ◦ aux′ where aux′ is the auxiliary information generated by the prover algorithm of Blum’s
Σ -protocol when the first message a is computed.
Algorithm HTDec on input auxa and a string m, runs the prover algorithm of Blum’s Σ -protocol on input the
transcript (setup, a,m) to obtain the last message z such that (setup, a,m, z) is an accepting transcript. HTDec can
run the prover algorithm since he can pick from auxa both the decommitment aux corresponding to com1 (i.e., the
witness for the statement) and the auxiliary information aux′ corresponding to a. The output of HTDec is dec = z.
Efficiency, completeness and hybridness. Efficiency and completeness can be easily verified by inspection.
Hybridness follows from the fact that a distinguisher of the distributions of the commitment parameters generated
by HGen and HTGen can be used for breaking the pseudorandomness of Naor’s commitments.
(HGen, HCom, HVer) is an unconditionally binding CS. When the commitment parameters are generated by
algorithm HGen, unconditional binding follows from the fact that, when the sender runs the protocol, the statement
com0 is a commitment of the string 1k – inferred by the commitment parameters – is false. Thus, once the pair
(setup, com = a) is established, there exists only one pair (m, z) such that (setup, a,m, z) is an accepting transcript
for the false statement “com0 is a commitment of the string 1k” (otherwise it would be possible to extract a witness for
a false statement, which is clearly impossible).
Now we show that a polynomial-time algorithm receiver that breaks the hiding property can be used to construct
an algorithm B that breaks the hiding property of Naor’s commitments. Assume there exists a receiver receiver
that can distinguish between the distributions {(com0, dec0) ← HCom(crs,m0) : com0} and {(com1, dec1) ←
HCom(crs,m1) : com1} with probability 1/2 + µ (for some non-negligible quantity µ). On input a challenge com
(which is either a commitment of 1k or a commitment of 0k) and the set-up message setup for Naor’s commitment
scheme, B constructs the commitment (HGen, HCom, HVer) as follows.
HGen simply sets crs = setup ◦ com. The algorithms HCom and HVer remain unchanged. Now, B flips a bit b,
chooses two random messages m0,m1, computes comb = HCom(crs,mb) and runs receiver on input comb,m0,m1
(with common reference string crs). Eventually receiver stops and outputs bˆ as its guess for the hidden bit b.
Now, if bˆ = b, B claims that com is a commitment of 0k , otherwise it claims that com is a commitment of 1k . This
is because if com is a commitment of 0k then the construction above gives rise to a valid commitment (i.e., comb is a
valid commitment of mb) and thus the advantage of receiver in predicting b is close to µ.
On the other hand, if com is a commitment of 1k then receiver can not guess b with probability non-negligibly
better than 1/2. This is because, this time, the statement “com is a commitment of the string 1k” is a true one. Thus, for
a fixed value comb, and for any message m there always exists a value z such that (setup, comb,m, z) is an accepting
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transcript.1 This means that the value comb does not reveal any information about mb. Thus, receiver can not guess
b with probability non-negligibly better than 1/2.
(HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) is a trapdoor CS. This follows directly by Theorem 3.1, by observing that
(HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) are the same algorithms as used in that Theorem.
From the previous properties, we have that HTCS enjoys both hybridness and trapdoorness, therefore the claim
holds.
Theorem 3.2. Under the assumption that the Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem is hard, there exists an efficient
hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
Proof. We use the same proof ideas as used to prove Theorem 3.1. To gain in efficiency however, we consider more
specific number-theoretic constructions. In what follows we only discuss the aspects of the proof which are different
with respect to the previous one. First of all, while in Theorem 3.1 the security is proved by resorting to the properties
of Naor’s commitment scheme, in this case we use the DDH assumption.
Let G be a group of order q where the DDH problem is conjectured to be hard. Informally this means that
given two random elements g, h 6= 1 ∈ G, it is computationally infeasible to distinguish between (g, h, gr , hr )
and (g, h, gr1 , hr2) for three random elements r, r1, r2 ∈ Zq .
Algorithm HGen outputs a random string crs. From a random string it is possible to deterministically extract a
quadruple such that the probability that its distribution is different from (g, h, gr1 , hr2) is negligible. Instead, HTGen
outputs a crs and the auxiliary information aux = r , such that by running the same deterministic extraction procedure,
the resulting quadruple has the same distribution as (g, h, gr , hr ). Notice that by the hardness of the DDH problem,
the output crs of HTGen is computationally indistinguishable from a random string.
Consider the Σ -protocol for proving the equality of two discrete logarithms (see Appendix B). Let us call ∇ this
protocol. Denoting by (g, h, g1, h1) the quadruple in the crs, we use ∇ to prove that g1 and h1 have the same discrete
logarithm with respect to bases g and h, respectively.
As for the case of the proof of Theorem 3.1, when HGen is used, the instance for the Σ -protocol is false.
Consequently, once a commitment a is sent, it can correspond to at most one message m such that there exists
an accepting transcript (a,m, z). When the commitment parameters (g, h, gr , hr ) are established by HTGen, then
knowledge of r (the trapdoor) allows one to send a commitment a that can later be opened as any possible message
m. This is because, by running the prover algorithm of the Σ -protocol on input r (as witness) and m (as challenge),
it is always possible to find a z such that (a,m, z) is an accepting transcript. In this a commitment computed and
opened by means of the trapdoor is statistically indistinguishable from the one that is honestly computed and opened
and therefore, is indistinguishable even if the receiver knows the trapdoor. This means that, standard hybrid arguments
show that the security is preserved for any polynomial number of commitments. The efficiency of this commitment
scheme directly follows from the efficiency of the considered Σ -protocol. 
Other efficient implementations based on Paillier’s Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption [60] enjoy also
the extractability property and can be found in Appendix C.
A construction for hybrid multi-trapdoor (resp., simulation-sound trapdoor) commitment schemes may seem, at
first, much harder to achieve. After all, multi-trapdoor commitments need more complex parameters (with respect
to basic trapdoor ones) and, to have a hybrid version of them, we need to make sure that these parameters remain
distributed in such a way that it should be hard to say which of the two commitment generation algorithms was used
to produce them.
Informally, we solve this problem by composing a multi-trapdoor (resp., simulation-sound trapdoor) commitment
scheme with a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme as those described so far. The composition is made by considering
the concatenation of both commitment parameters. Moreover all the operations made by the committing and
decommitting algorithms are performed twice, once for each subscheme. Intuitively, using this technique, when
a multi-trapdoor (resp., simulation-sound trapdoor) commitment scheme is composed with the hybrid trapdoor
commitment scheme instantiated as a trapdoor commitment scheme, the resulting scheme is still a multi-trapdoor
1 Note that, even though such a z is guaranteed to exist, B may not be able to efficiently compute it. This is not a problem for our proof as all
that we need is to make sure that such a z actually exists.
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(resp., simulation-sound trapdoor) commitment scheme. On the other hand, if the hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme
is instantiated as an unconditionally binding commitment scheme, then the resulting scheme is unconditionally
binding. By the indistinguishability of the commitment parameters of the two instantiations we obtain the desired
result.
More formally, we prove the following theorems.
Theorem 3.3. Under the assumption that multi-trapdoor commitment schemes exist there exists a hybrid multi-
trapdoor commitment scheme.
Proof. First of all, the existence of multi-trapdoor commitment schemes implies the existence of one-way functions
and therefore by Theorem 3.1 implies the existence of hybrid trapdoor commitment schemes.
Let C0 = (Gen, Sel, Tkg, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) and C1 = (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) be
respectively a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme and a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
We now show a construction of C = (HGen′, HTGen′, HSel′, HTkg′, HCom′, HTCom′, HTDec′, HVer′) which is a
hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment scheme.
HGen′(1k) outputs crs = PK0 ◦crs1 where (PK0, TK0) is the output of Gen(1k) and crs1 is the output of HGen(1k).
HTGen′(1k) outputs (crs = PK0 ◦ crs1, aux = (TK0, aux1)) where (PK0, TK0) is the output of Gen(1k) and
(crs1, aux1) is the output of HTGen(1k).
HSel′(crs = PK0 ◦ crs1) outputs pk = (pk0, crs1) where pk0 is the output of Sel(PK0).
HTkg′(aux = (TK0, aux1), pk) outputs tk = (tk0, aux1) where tk0 is the output of Tkg(TK0, pk).
HCom′(pk = pk0 ◦ crs1, v) outputs (com = (com0, com1), dec = (dec0, dec1)) where (com0, dec0) is the output
of Com(pk0, v) and (com1, dec1) is the output of HCom(crs1, v).
HTCom′(tk = (tk0, aux1), v) outputs (com = (com0, com1), auxcom = (auxcom0 , auxcom1)) where
(com0, auxcom0) is the output of TCom(tk0) and (com1, auxcom1) is the output of HTCom(aux1).
HTDec′(auxcom = (auxcom0 , auxcom1), v′) outputs dec′ = (dec′0, dec′1) where dec′0 and dec′1 are respectively
the output of TDec(auxcom0 , v
′) and the output of HTDec(auxcom1 , v′).
HVer′(pk = pk0 ◦ crs1, com = (com0, com1), dec = (dec0, dec1), v) outputs a bit b = (b0 ∧ b1) where
Ver(pk0, com0, dec0, v) = b0 and HVer(crs1, com1, dec1, v) = b1.
Efficiency and completeness are straightforward.
Multi-trapdoorness. Now we prove that (HTGen′, HSel′, HTkg′, HCom′, HTCom′, HTDec′, HVer′) is a multi-trapdoor
commitment scheme. In particular we have to prove the following properties: multi-trapdoorness, hiding and binding.
To prove that the given scheme is a multi-trapdoor one, we assume that there exists an adversary A that breaks the
multi-trapdoor property with some (non-negligible) advantage µ. Then we show how to build an efficient algorithm
B which uses A to break either the multi-trapdoorness of C0 or the trapdoorness of C1. We consider the following
games:
Game G0: A commitment on a message m is generated by concatenating a commitment generated using the function
Com (i.e., the commitment function of C0) and a commitment generated using HCom (i.e., the commitment
function of C1).
Game G1: A commitment on a message m is generated by concatenating a commitment generated using Com and a
commitment generated using the function HTCom (i.e., the equivocation function of C1).
Game G2: A commitment on a message m is generated by concatenating a commitment generated using the function
TCom (i.e., the equivocation function of C0) and a commitment generated using HTCom.
We define Pi (i = 0, 1, 2) as the probability that A succeeds in game Gi . Since we are assuming that A has a
(non-negligible) advantage µ in breaking the multi-trapdoorness property of C , we have that
µ = |P0 − P2| ≤ |P0 − P1| + |P1 − P2|
Thus either |P0 − P1| or |P1 − P2| has to be non-negligible.
In what follows we focus on the simpler case in which the adversary asks one commitment only. The more general
case in which A may ask polynomially many commitments goes as discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
If |P0− P1| is non-negligible, we proceed as follows. B receives on input, from a challenging oracleOM the public
parameters for a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme C0 and usesA to break the multi-trapdoorness property of C0 as
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follows. First it runs the HGen algorithm to generate a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme C1 (for which, of course it
will know the trapdoor to equivocate). Next it chooses a random message m and asks OM to commit to it. The oracle
works as follows. On input m it flips a random bit b and, if b = 0 it commits to m using the function Com, otherwise it
commits to m using the function TCom (in fact, in this latter case B would commit to nothing). In both cases the oracle
outputs the commitment com, and the corresponding decommitment dec for m. Next B commits to m using HCom
and outputs the composition of the two commitments (i.e., the one received from the oracle and the one it produced).
Clearly if A on input m, the received commitment and the corresponding decommitment, has some non-negligible
advantage in guessing if it is playing game G0 or game G1, this can be used here to guess b with non-negligible
advantage (and then to break the multi-trapdoorness property of C0).
If |P1− P2| is non-negligible, B receives on input, from a challenging oracleOh the public parameters for a hybrid
trapdoor commitment scheme C1 and usesA to break the trapdoorness property of C1 as follows. First it runs the Gen
algorithm to generate a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme C0. Next it chooses a random message m and asks Oh to
either produce a commitment on m using HCom or using HTCom (according to a hidden bit b). Let com∗, dec∗ be the
commitment and decommitment returned by the oracle. Next B commits tom using TCom and outputs the composition
of the two commitments (i.e., the one received from the oracle and the one it produced) and the two decommitments.
Once again, if A on input m, the commitment and decommitment, has some non-negligible advantage in guessing if
it is playing game G1 or game G2 this can be used to guess b with non-negligible advantage (and then to break the
trapdoorness property of C1).
The hiding property can be proved similarly. Assume that we have an adversary A that breaks the hiding property
of C ; we show here how to use it to break the hiding property of either C0 or C1. We consider the following games
based on two messages m1,m0 (such that m0 6= m1 and |m0| = |m1|).
Game G0: A commitment on the message m0 is generated by concatenating a commitment (to m0) generated using
the function Com (i.e., the commitment function of C0) and a commitment generated using HCom (i.e., the
commitment function of C1).
Game G1: A commitment is generated by concatenating a commitment to m0 generated using the function Com and
a commitment to m1 generated using HTCom.
Game G2: A commitment on the message m1 is generated by concatenating a commitment generated using the
function TCom and a commitment generated using HTCom.
The rest proceeds exactly as for the multi-trapdoorness property.
The binding property, on the other hand, can be reduced to the binding property of the multi-trapdoor commitment
scheme only. More precisely we prove that if there is an attacker A for this property then it can be used to construct
an efficient algorithm B that breaks the binding property of the underlying multi-trapdoor commitment scheme.
B goes as follows. It receives on input the public parameters for the multi-trapdoor commitment scheme C0 and
it generates a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme C1. Finally it sets C = C0 ◦ C1 as the hybrid multi-trapdoor
commitment scheme. Note that, by these positions, the public parameters of C1 are totally independent with respect
to those of C0. This is crucial for our proof to go through correctly.
Now whenever A asks for an equivocation for some key pki , B “transforms” pki into a valid public key pk′i for
C0 and asks a similar question of equivocation oracle for the multi-trapdoor commitment scheme. Once it gets back
an answer a, it creates a fake commitment a′ for C1 using its own trapdoor and sends a ◦ a′ to A. If A produces an
equivocation on a previously unasked key, B can easily use it to break the binding property of C0 in an obvious way.
Hybridness. The commitment parameters have two different distributions that only depend on the generation
algorithm of the hybrid trapdoor commitment subscheme. Therefore, a distinguisher of the two distributions of the
commitment parameters generated by our scheme can be easily reduced to a distinguisher of the distributions of the
commitment parameters generated by the hybrid trapdoor commitment subscheme used in the construction.
Remark. Algorithms HGen and HTGen run on input the same security parameter 1k and obviously each of them
uses a different randomness. Notice that this is required by our construction of hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment
schemes. Indeed, if the master trapdoor of the multi-trapdoor commitment subscheme and the trapdoor of the hybrid
trapdoor commitment subscheme are related, the binding of the resulting hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment scheme
could not hold anymore. This is due to the game played by the adversary of the binding property that by means of
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a polynomial number of accesses to a decommitting oracle, could compute from two different openings of the same
commitment, the trapdoor of the hybrid trapdoor commitment subscheme. Obviously, if this trapdoor is related to the
master trapdoor of the multi-trapdoor commitment subscheme or even to a local trapdoor not used during the queries
to the oracle, the adversary violates the binding of the scheme. 
Note that, with the theorem above, we show how to construct hybrid multi-trapdoor commitments from the
hypothesis that multi-trapdoor commitments exist. We also show that multi-trapdoor commitments exist iff secure
signature against generic chosen message attack exist (see Appendix D for further discussions about these objects).
Notice that one-way functions are equivalent to secure signatures [67] in the sense of [49], which, in turn, imply
secure signatures against generic chosen message attack exist. This means that Theorem 3.3 can be restated as follows.
Theorem 3.4. Under the assumption that one-way functions exist, there exists a hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment
scheme.
As for the case of hybrid trapdoor commitments we briefly discuss some efficient implementations based on number
theoretic assumptions. These constructions can be obtained straightforwardly from the two efficient multi-trapdoor
commitment schemes presented in [44] (the reader is referred to [44] for more details). In particular, the first relies
on the strong RSA assumption and on the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. The second implementation can
be shown to be secure under the strong Diffie–Hellman assumption and, again, on the decisional Diffie–Hellman
assumption. The reader is referred to Appendix A for a discussion about the strong RSA assumption and the strong
Diffie–Hellman assumption.
Theorem 3.5. Under the assumption that the strong RSA and DDH problems are hard (or under the assumption
that the strong Diffie–Hellman [9] and DDH problems are hard), there exists an efficient hybrid multi-trapdoor
commitment scheme.
Proof. The construction of a hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment scheme given in the proof of Theorem 3.3 used a
modular composition of a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme and a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme. Therefore,
by using the results of [44] (see the full version at [43]) and Theorem 3.2 the claim holds. 
Theorem 3.6. Under the assumption that one-way functions exist, there exists a hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor
commitment scheme.
Proof. Let C0 = (Gen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) be the simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme presented
in [55] that is based on the existence of a one-way function f . By Theorem 3.1 the existence of f implies the
existence of a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme C1 = (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer). We use both
C0 and C1 to construct C = (HGen′, HTGen′, HCom′, HTCom′, HTDec′, HVer′) which is a hybrid simulation-sound
trapdoor commitment scheme.
HGen′(1k) outputs (crs = crs0 ◦ crs1) where crs0 is the output of Gen(1k) and crs1 is the output of HGen(1k).
HTGen′(1k) outputs (crs = crs0 ◦ crs1, aux = (aux0, aux1) where (crs0, aux0) is the output of Gen(1k) and
(crs1, aux1) is the output of HTGen(1k).
HCom′(crs, v, tag) outputs (com = (com0, com1), dec = (dec0, dec1)) where (com0, dec0) is the output of
Com(crs0, v, tag) and (com1, dec1) is the output of HCom(crs1, v).
HTCom′(crs = crs0 ◦ crs1, aux = (aux0, aux1), v, tag) outputs (com = (com0, com1), auxcom =
(auxcom0 , auxcom1)) where (com0, auxcom0) is the output of TCom(aux0, v, tag) and (com1, auxcom1) is the output
of HTCom(aux1, v).
HTDec′(auxcom = (auxcom0 , auxcom1), com = (com0, com1), v, tag) outputs dec = (dec0, dec1) where dec0
is the output of TDec(auxcom0 , v, tag) and dec1 is the output of HTDec(auxcom1 , v).
HVer′(crs = crs0 ◦ crs1, com = (com0, com1), dec = (dec0, dec1), v, tag) outputs a bit b = (b0 ∧ b1) where
Ver(crs0, com0, dec0, v, tag) = b0 and HVer(crs1, com1, dec1, v) = b1.
The proof of this theorem follows the one for Theorem 3.3.
Efficiency and completeness are straightforward.
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Simulation soundness. Now we prove that (HTGen′, HCom′, HTCom′, HTDec′, HVer′) is a simulation-sound trapdoor
commitment scheme. In other words we have to prove that:
1. (HTGen′, HCom′, HTCom′, HTDec′, HVer′) is a tag-based trapdoor commitment scheme;
2. the simulation-sound binding property holds.
To prove the first statement we start by showing that given (crs, aux)← HTGen′(1k) then the two distributions
{(com, dec)← HCom′(crs, v) : (crs, com, dec, v)} and
{(com′, auxcom′)← HTCom′(aux); dec′← HTDec′(auxcom′ , v) : (crs, com′, dec′, v)}
are computationally indistinguishable.
The following proof is, mutatis mutandis, the same as the one given to prove the multi-trapdoorness property of
the scheme presented in Theorem 3.3. Thus, here we skip some obvious details already discussed there.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this does not hold, than we show that either C0 or C1 can not be a
trapdoor commitment scheme. We consider the following games
Game G0: A commitment (with respect to tag tag) on a message m is generated by concatenating a commitment
generated using the function Com (i.e., the commitment function of C0) and a commitment generated using
HCom (i.e., the commitment function of C1).
Game G1: A commitment (with respect to tag tag) on a message m is generated by concatenating a commitment
generated using the function TCom (i.e., the equivocation function of C0) and a commitment generated using
HCom.
Game G2: A commitment on a message m (with respect to tag tag) is generated by concatenating a commitment
generated using the function TCom and a commitment generated using HTCom (i.e., the equivocation function
of C1).
We define Pi (i = 0, 1, 2) as the probability that A (i.e., the adversary that is assumed to break the trapdoorness
property of C) succeeds in game Gi . Since we are assuming that A has a (non-negligible) advantage µ in breaking
the simulation-soundness property of C , we have that
µ = |P0 − P2| ≤ |P0 − P1| + |P1 − P2|.
Thus either |P0 − P1| or |P1 − P2| has to be non-negligible.
In the former case we proceed as follows. We construct an algorithm B that receives on input, from a challenging
oracle OSS the public parameters for a simulation sound trapdoor commitment scheme C0 and uses A to break the
trapdoor property of C0 as follows. First it runs the HTGen algorithm to generate a hybrid trapdoor commitment
scheme C1. Next it chooses a random message m and asksOSS to commit to it. The oracle works as follows. On input
m it flips a random bit b and, if b = 0 it commits to m using the function Com, otherwise it commits using the function
TCom. In both cases, the oracle outputs the computed commitment along with the corresponding decommitment to m.
Next B commits to m using HCom and outputs the composition of the two commitments (i.e., the one received from
the oracle and the one it produced) and of the two decommitments. Clearly if A has some non-negligible advantage
in guessing if it is playing game G0 or game G1 this can be used here to guess b with non-negligible advantage (and
then to break the trapdoorness property of C0).
A similar argument can be done for the case on which |P1 − P2| is non-negligible.
The hiding property can be proved similarly. Assume that we have an adversary A that breaks the hiding property
of C ; we show how to use it to break the hiding property of either C0 or C1. The rest of the proof goes exactly as for
the case of the hiding property for the multi-trapdoor commitment scheme discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.3.
The binding property can be proved exactly as we proved the binding property for the multi-trapdoor commitment
scheme of Theorem 3.3.
It remains to prove the second statement, i.e., that the simulation sound binding property holds. We prove this by
showing that if there exists an adversary A that breaks the simulation sound binding property of C , it can be used, by
an algorithm B, to break the same property of C0. B goes as follows. On a preliminary phase B runs a key generation
algorithm to generate a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme C1. Then it receives as input, from a challenging oracle
OSSTC, the public parameters for a simulation sound trapdoor commitment scheme C0 and generates C as described
in the very first part of the proof of this theorem.
D. Catalano, I. Visconti / Theoretical Computer Science 374 (2007) 229–260 245
Whenever A asks an equivocation query on C , B asks for a corresponding equivocation query on C0 to the oracle
OSSTC and uses the received answer to produce a valid equivocation for C . Thus if A breaks the simulation-sound
binding property of C , this immediately leads B to break the simulation-sound binding property of C1.
Hybridness. The commitment parameters have two different distributions that only depend on the generation
algorithm of the hybrid trapdoor commitment subscheme. Therefore, a distinguisher of the two distributions of the
commitment parameters generated by our scheme can be easily reduced to a distinguisher of the distributions of the
commitment parameters generated by hybrid trapdoor commitment subscheme used in the construction. 
Theorem 3.7. Under the assumption that the DSA signature scheme is secure and the DDH problem is hard (or under
the assumption that the Cramer–Shoup signature scheme [25] is secure and the DDH problem is hard), there exists
an efficient hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme.
Proof. The construction of a hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme given in the proof of Theorem 3.6
used a modular composition of a simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme and a hybrid trapdoor commitment
scheme. Therefore, by using the results of [55] and Theorem 3.2 the claim holds. 
4. Hybrid trapdoor commitments: Applications
In this section we describe some important applications of our primitive. In particular we show that hybrid trapdoor
commitments can be used to construct interactive protocols that achieve strong notions of zero knowledge. More
precisely we improve the computational soundness of the concurrent zero-knowledge arguments of [29], and of both
the simulation-sound and left-concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments of [44,55] by showing how to
achieve zero-knowledge proofs (rather than only arguments). Therefore the security of our constructions holds even
against computationally unbounded adversarial provers. Moreover, our zero-knowledge proofs can be based on the
same complexity-theoretic assumptions as used in [29,44,55]. The efficient constructions also require the hardness of
the DDH problem.
4.1. Background
The classical notion of a zero-knowledge proof system has been introduced in [48]. Roughly speaking, in a zero-
knowledge proof system a prover can prove to a verifier the validity of a statement without releasing any additional
information. Since its introduction, the concept of a zero-knowledge proof system and the simulation paradigm have
been widely used to prove the security of many protocols.
Concurrent zero knowledge. The notion of concurrent zero knowledge [35] formalizes security in a scenario
in which several verifiers access concurrently a prover and maliciously coordinate their actions so as to extract
information from the prover. In [15] it has been shown that in the black-box model Ω˜(log n) rounds are necessary
for concurrent zero knowledge for non-trivial languages. The first concurrent zero-knowledge proof system for NP
has been given by [65] that showed that O(n) rounds are sufficient for any  > 0. Poly-logarithmic round-complexity
was achieved in [52] and, finally, in [64] it is shown that O˜(log n) rounds are sufficient. The proof systems presented
in [65,52,64] are black-box zero knowledge and the round-complexity of the proof system of [64] is almost optimal
in view of the lower bound proved in [15]. Thus unlike the stand-alone case, black-box concurrent zero knowledge
can not be achieved in a constant number of rounds.
Different models have been presented in which round-efficient black-box concurrent zero knowledge is possible.
In [35,36,45] constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems have been presented by relaxing the
asynchrony of the model or the zero-knowledge property. In [29,8], constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof
systems have been presented assuming the existence of a common reference string or a shared random string (i.e., a
trusted third party) while in [33,70] a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge with concurrent soundness argument
system is shown by assuming that there exists a public repository that contains the public keys of the verifiers. In [63]
an almost constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge argument systems is presented by assuming the existence of
only one stateful prover. Furthermore, Pass [61] gave a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge argument with a
super-polynomial-time simulator. In [1], Barak presented a non-black-box constant-round bounded-concurrent zero-
knowledge argument system. The construction of [1] assumes that the maximum number of concurrent sessions is
known in advance.
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Simulation-sound zero knowledge. Simulation-sound zero knowledge has been introduced in [68] for the purpose
of constructing cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. This concept is related to the concept
of non-malleability introduced in [34]. Indeed, both notions deal with an adversary (called theman-in-the-middle) that
simultaneously participates in many executions of a proof systems and acts as a prover in some of them and as a verifier
in the other ones. The adversary has complete control over the scheduling of the messages in the executions of the
protocols. Informally, a zero-knowledge proof system is said to be concurrent simulation sound if the information that
the man-in-the-middle adversary collects as a verifier from concurrent sessions played with a simulated prover does
not help him to prove a false statement. Here the man-in-the-middle can choose to see simulated proofs of true and
false statements.
Simulation-sound zero knowledge plays an important role for proving the security of protocols. Indeed, when the
simulation paradigm is used to prove the security of a protocol, the simulator could, in some cases, need to simulate
the proof of a false statement. Here simulation soundness is crucial since the adversary could gain knowledge from
such a proof in order to prove a false statement in another protocol.
4.2. Definitions
Notation. We use the same notation as [55,54]. Let A and B be two interactive algorithms, we define 〈A, B〉crs(x)
as the local output of B after an interactive execution with A using crs as common reference string. The transcript of
an algorithm is the pair composed by its input and output. Two transcripts match if the ordered input messages of the
first are equivalent to the ordered output of the other, and vice versa. We use the notation tr FG tr ′ to indicate that tr
matches tr ′. Moreover we denote by A a wrapper algorithm that handles concurrent interactions of A. More precisely,
A can receive two types of input:
1. (START, α, x, w). For this input the wrapper starts a new (interactive) session of A, with label α, common input x ,
(freshly generated) randomness r and private inputw. We require that the new machine uses the common reference
of A.
2. (MSG, α,m). For this input the wrapper sends m to the interactive machine labeled with α (if such a machine
exists) and outputs the output message of that machine.
We denote by (x, tr, b) the output of A where x is the common input, tr the transcript of the sessions (input and
output messages) and b the output. We say that B and C are coordinated if they have a single control, but distinct
inputs and outputs. Given four interactive algorithms A, B,C and D we denote by (〈A, B〉, 〈C, D〉)crs the output of
D after an interactive execution with C and an interactive execution of A and B, all using crs as a common reference
string.
Definition 4.1 (Unbounded Zero Knowledge Proofs). Let L be an NP-language, G, P, V, S0, S1 be probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms. We say that Π = (G, P, V, S = (S0, S1)) is an unbounded concurrent zero-knowledge
proof system in the common reference string model for L , if:
– completeness: for every x ∈ L where |x | = POLY(k), all w such that RL(x, w) = 1 there exists a negligible
function ν such that
Prob(crs← G(1k) : 〈P(w), V 〉(crs)(x) = 0) ≤ ν(k);
– soundness: for any unbounded algorithm P? there exists a negligible function ν such that for any x 6∈ L ,
Prob(crs← HGen(1k); 〈P?, V 〉(crs)(x) = 1) ≤ ν(k);
– unbounded concurrent zero knowledge: for any polynomial-time adversarial verifier V ? there exists a negligible
function ν such that
|Prob(ExptV ?(k) = 1)− Prob(ExptSV ?(k) = 1)| ≤ ν(k)
where the experiments ExptV ?(k) and Expt
S
V ?(k) are defined as follows:
ExptV ?(k): Expt
S
V ?(k) :
crs← G(1k) (crs, aux)← S0(1k)
return〈P, V ?〉crs return〈S′(aux), V ?〉crs
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where S′(aux) on input a common reference string crs, common input x and private input w, computes
b = RL(x, w) and then if b = 1 he runs S1(aux, x), otherwise he aborts (we assume that a prover on input a
bad witness aborts as well).
Notice that, in the definition above, S1 is required to simulate only valid proofs. This is realized by having S′ access
the witness for the given statement and executing S1 only if the witness is valid. Thus, S1 does not know the witness
and has to simulate a valid proof from x only. This approach assumes that (as previously specified in [68,55]), for the
case in which the statements are adaptively chosen by the adversary, the latter has to supply a witness to the prover
(and thus to S′). This is because the prover here is restricted to probabilistic polynomial time, and then may not be
able to generate witnesses by himself. As argued by Sahai [68], this seems to capture the correct notion of unbounded
zero knowledge. In particular, this requirement does not allow A to test membership in L . This is because, intuitively,
the adversary can produce valid witnesses and test their truthfulness only for statements of its own choice.
Definition 4.2 (Unbounded Simulation-Sound Zero-Knowledge Proofs). Let L be an NP-language and G, P, V, S0,
S1 be probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.We say thatΠ = (G, P, V, S = (S0, S1)) is an unbounded simulation-
sound zero-knowledge proof system in the common reference string model for L , if there exists a negligible function
ν such that for all k it holds that:
– unbounded concurrent zero knowledge: Π is an unbounded concurrent zero-knowledge proof system for L;
– unbounded simulation soundness: for any polynomial-time adversary A = (A0,A1), where A0 and A1 are
coordinated there exists a negligible function ν such that Prob(ExptA(k) = 1) ≤ ν(k) where the experiment
ExptA(k) is defined as follows:
ExptA(k):
(crs, aux)← S0(1k)
(x, tr, b)← (〈S1(aux),A0〉, 〈A1, V 〉)crs
Let Q be the set of the transcripts of S1(aux)
return 1 if and only if b = 1, x 6∈ L and for all tr ′ ∈ Q tr 6FG tr ′.
Notice that since S′′ does not check whether there is a witness for x ∈ L . S1 potentially simulates both true and
false proofs.
4.3. Concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems
In [29], three-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments in the common reference string model are presented.
More precisely Damga˚rd [29] presents a general protocol based on the existence of one-way functions only and an
efficient implementation based on number-theoretic assumptions. In this section we improve on this result by showing
(constructively) the existence of three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof (in contrast to argument) systems in
the common reference string model. The first construction needs the sole assumption that one-way functions exist,
while the second, more efficient, construction relies on the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. Interestingly both
constructions hold in the shared random string model as well.
In our construction we consider unbounded black-box zero-knowledge proof systems with a non-rewinding
simulator (which, consequently, is also concurrent zero knowledge).
Theorem 4.3. If one-way functions exist, there exists a three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof system in the
common reference string model for any NP language.
Proof. Consider the language for graph Hamiltonicity and the Σ -protocol by Blum [7] based on the existence of
one-way functions (see Section B). We consider the following common reference string crs = crs0 ◦ crs1 where
crs0 corresponds to the first message of Naor’s commitment scheme while crs1 corresponds to the commitment
parameters of a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme HTCS= (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer) based on
the existence of one-way functions only.
The prover P runs the prover algorithm of Blum’s Σ -protocol to obtain the first message a. Then P uses HTCS
(and in particular HCom) to commit to a, i.e., it computes (com, dec) – that are, respectively, the commitment and
decommitment of a – and it sends com to the verifier V .
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V replies with a challenge c (as in Blum’s Σ -protocol).
P runs again the prover algorithm of Blum’s Σ -protocol to compute the last message z and sends (a, dec, z) to the
verifier. Finally, if HVer(crs1, com, dec, a) = 1 and (crs0, a, c, z) is an accepting transcript (for Blum’sΣ -protocol),
the verifier accepts the proof.
Completeness is straightforward.
Soundness follows from the fact that when the prover and the verifier interact, the reference string specifies an
unconditionally binding commitment scheme, therefore the proof of soundness proceeds exactly as the one for Blum’s
Σ -protocol that holds against any unbounded adversarial prover.
To prove that the protocol is concurrent zero knowledge we describe a simulator S = (S0, S1) that works as follows.
S0 computes crs′ = crs′0 ◦ crs′1 where crs′0 is the output of algorithm receiver of Naor’s commitment scheme
and crs′1 is computed by running algorithm HTGen. Recall that HTGen returns a trapdoor aux as auxiliary output. This
trapdoor will be used later by S1. Note that, in this case, the string crs′1 specifies a trapdoor commitment scheme.
Once the common reference string is generated, S1 runs the first round of the prover algorithm of Blum’s Σ -
protocol2 and computes a. Next S1 runs HTCom (with commitment parameters crs′1 and trapdoor aux) and obtains
back the pair (com, dec) corresponding to the committing and decommitting keys of a commitment of junk bits. S1
proceeds by sending com to the verifier V ? and waits for V ? to send a challenge c′.
Once c′ is received, S1 runs the simulator corresponding to the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of
Blum’s Σ -protocol, on input crs′0 and c′. S1 obtains a pair a′, z′ such that (crs′0, a′, c′, z′) is an accepting transcript
for the verifier of Blum’s protocol. S1 runs algorithm HTDec by using the trapdoor aux in order to open com as a′ and
outputs decommitting key dec′. Finally S1 sends to V ? the last message (a′, dec′, z′).
We can now focus on the difference between the concurrent proofs given by the simulator with respect to the ones
given by the honest prover. We consider the following games.
Game G0: this game corresponds to an execution of the honest prover.
Game G1: the only difference from game G0 is that here the reference string is generated using the simulator.
Game G2: the only difference from game G1 is that now the prover uses the cheating committing and decommitting
algorithms HTCom, HTDec instead of the honest one HCom.
Game G3: this game corresponds to an execution of the simulator and the the only difference from game G2 is that
now the prover uses the simulator of the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property.
Standard hybrid arguments can be used to show that the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
First of all, game G0 and game G1 are not distinguishable since otherwise the hybridness property of the hybrid
trapdoor commitment scheme is contradicted. Game G1 and game G2 are not distinguishable since otherwise the
trapdoorness of the trapdoor commitment scheme that is part of the hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme can be
easily contradicted (notice that this holds even in the presence of any polynomial number of commitments, moreover
we proved the indistinguishability of our commitments even with respect to adaptive adversarial receivers). Finally,
game G2 and game G3 are not distinguishable since the special honest verifier zero-knowledge property of the Blum
Σ -protocol works for any possible challenge (thus even for adaptively chosen challenges) and is known to be preserved
even in the case of concurrent executions. 
Notice that the reference string used in the proof of Theorem 4.3 is uniformly distributed. Thus we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. If one-way functions exist, there exists a three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof system in the
shared random string model for any NP language.
Theorem 4.5. Given an NP language L that admits an efficient Σ -protocol, then under the DDH assumption there
exists a three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof system in the common reference string model for L.
Proof. The proof follows the one of Theorem 4.3, however in this case we can use the efficient DDH-based hybrid
trapdoor commitment scheme described in Theorem 3.2 and an unconditionally binding commitment scheme based
on the DDH assumption (e.g., the one proposed in [56]). 
2 In this round the prover does not use the witness.
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Notice that the reference string used in the proof of Theorem 4.5 is uniformly distributed. Thus we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.6. Given an NP language L that admits an efficient Σ -protocol, then under the DDH assumption there
exists a three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proof system in the shared random string model for L.
4.4. Simulation-sound zero knowledge
The notion of simulation soundness has been used for the design of many secure cryptographic primitives (see for
instance [68,62]). Informally, a proof system is simulation sound if an adversary that plays the role of verifier when
the proofs are simulated for both true and false instances, is not able to play as a prover another session of the protocol
in which he convinces an honest verifier of a false statement.
In [55], MacKenzie and Yang proposed three-round unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge argument
systems in the common reference string model, in particular their arguments use simulation-sound trapdoor
commitment schemes, therefore they obtain efficient argument systems based on the security of DSA [58] or the
Cramer–Shoup [25] signature schemes and argument systems based on the existence of one-way functions.
As already discussed in Section 1.1, the multi-trapdoor commitments presented in [44] allow for more efficient
constructions of unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge argument systems.
In this section we extend their results by showing the existence (constructively) of three-round unbounded
simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof (in contrast to argument) systems in the common reference string model.
We can achieve this result either by using hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitments instead of non-hybrid
simulation-sound trapdoor commitments in the construction of [55] or by using hybrid multi-trapdoor commitments
instead of non-hybrid multi-trapdoor commitments in the construction of [44].
For each of these two results we give a first construction that needs the sole assumption that one-way functions
exist. Then we give a more efficient second construction that requires (on top of the assumptions described for the
efficient constructions of [55] and [44]) the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption.
Theorem 4.7. If one-way functions exist, there exists a three-round unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge
proof system in the common reference string model for any NP language.
Proof. Given any one-way function, we know by Theorem 3.6 that there exists (constructively) a hybrid simulation-
sound trapdoor commitment scheme HSSTCS. The basic idea of this proof is then to plug HSSTCS (rather than
an SSTC) in the construction of [55] (see Fig. 2 of [54]). Now we show that this allows us to obtain a three-round
unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof system in the common reference string model (rather than an
argument as in [55]).
Completeness. This property follows directly by inspection.
(Classical) soundness. The first part of the common reference string is generated by HGen, thus when the prover P
runs the protocol to compute a commitment of a (where, again, a is the first message of the underlying Σ -protocol)
he actually uses an unconditionally binding commitment scheme. This means that even an unbounded prover can not
later open the commitment with a message a′ 6= a. Indeed suppose that P? succeeds in proving a false statement
with some non-negligible probability p. Let (a, c, z) be the transcript of the corresponding Σ -protocol and let coma
be the commitment that has been opened as a commitment of a. Now since we are dealing with a Σ -protocol we
can run an extractor that, having black-box access to P?, obtains another accepting transcript (a′, c′, z′) which is still
valid with respect to the commitment coma . Notice that such an extractor succeeds in polynomial time because p is
non-negligible and the challenges are chosen uniformly and at random. Thus the statement being false, it has to be the
case that a′ 6= a otherwise, by the special-soundness property of the Σ -protocol, we would obtain a witness for a false
statement (and this is a contradiction). However, the fact that a′ 6= a and both correspond to the same commitment
coma violates the unconditional binding of the commitment scheme instantiated by HGen.
Unbounded concurrent zero knowledge. The simulator uses HTGen to generate the reference string and uses the
corresponding trapdoor to generate a straight-line simulation. The output of the simulator (that runs only on input true
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statements) and the output of a real interaction between a prover and an adversarial verifier V ? have the following
differences:
1. the reference string is generated by HTGen instead of HGen;
2. the simulator uses HTCom and HTDec instead of HCom;
3. the simulator uses the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of the Σ -protocol instead of the prover
algorithm of the Σ -protocol.
Suppose that an adversarial verifier A = V ? outputs 1 with probability pR after a real interaction but outputs
1 with probability pS after a simulated interaction. We show that there exists a negligible function ν0 such that
|pR − pS| ≤ ν0(k). As discussed above, in the real game, algorithm HGen generates the commitment parameters
and A interacts with P , while in the simulated game algorithm HTGen generates the commitment parameters and A
interacts with a simulator. Consider the following hybrid games.
Game 0: the commitment parameters are generated by HTGen, A0 interacts with an algorithm H0 that runs the
honest sender protocol of the commitment scheme and the honest prover algorithm of the Σ -protocol.
Game 1: the commitment parameters are generated by HTGen, A0 interacts with an algorithm H1 that uses HTCom
and HTDec to compute and open commitments and runs the honest prover algorithm of the Σ -protocol.
Let p0 be the probability that A outputs 1 at the end of the first hybrid game and p1 be the probability that A
outputs 1 at the end of the second hybrid game.
Since the only difference between the real game and the first hybrid game consists of the algorithm that generates
the commitment parameters we have that there must be a negligible function ν1 such that |p0− pR | < ν1(k), otherwise
A can be used to break the hybridness property of the hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme.
Since the only difference between the two hybrid games is the use of HCom in the first hybrid game and of TCom and
TDec in the second one, we have that there must be a negligible function ν2 such that |p0 − p1| ≤ ν2(k), otherwise A
can be used to break the trapdoorness of the hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme.
Finally, it must be the case that |p1− pS| ≤ ν3(k) for some non-negligible function ν3, otherwiseA can be used to
distinguish the second hybrid game from the simulated game. The only difference between these two games is the use
of the honest prover algorithm of the Σ -protocol in the second hybrid game and of the simulator of the honest-verifier
zero-knowledge property of the Σ -protocol in the simulated one. A is therefore a distinguisher between a transcript
of the honest prover of the Σ -protocol and the output of the honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol. This contradicts
the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of the Σ -protocol.
From the previous discussion we have that there exists a negligible function ν0 such that |pR − pS| ≤ ν0(k).
Unbounded simulation soundness. To prove unbounded simulation-soundness we proceed as follows. Suppose
that an adversary A succeeds in proving a false statement after having seen simulated proofs (we stress
that in this case the reference string is generated by HTGen as discussed in the proof of the unbounded
concurrent zero-knowledge property). We show that the ability of A to produce a valid proof on a
false statement can be used to violate the simulation soundness of a hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor
commitment scheme (HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HDec, HVer), i.e., the simulation-sound binding property of
(HTGen,HCom, HTCom,HDec, HVer).
More precisely, we show an algorithm A′ that plays the role of sender in the game described above for the
simulation-sound binding property of Definition 2.7 and, by black-box accessing to A, it either breaks the simulation
sound binding property of the commitment scheme or it breaks the unforgeability of the underlying one-time signature
scheme (see [54]).
The proof closely follows that of Theorem 4.1 in [54].
A′ receives as challenge the commitment parameters of a simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme
generated by HTGen. The polynomial-time adversary A = (A0,A1) interacts with A′ for obtaining accepting proofs
of both true and false statements. More specifically, in the simulated game, A′ completes his proofs by asking to
an oracle to equivocate some commitments with respect to his public keys for the one-time secure signature scheme
(that correspond to different tags for the commitment scheme). If A succeeds in proving a false statement by using
a public key already used by A′, then A can be used to break the security of the one-time secure signature scheme.
This is because there actually exist at least two different transcripts (one of A′ and one of A) with correct signatures
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with respect to the same public key. If instead A uses a new public key then the proof proceeds very similarly to the
one of classical soundness. Indeed, by using the extractor of the Σ -protocol, with non-negligible probability A will
complete again the protocol and from the two transcripts it is possible to extract two valid and different decommitments
with respect to the same commitment (and of course with respect to the same tag). This case therefore violates the
simulation-sound binding property of the commitment scheme since for this tag (that corresponds to the new public
key) the equivocation oracle has not been used.
Note that the transcript (i.e., the distribution of the reference string and the messages exchanged) of the simulation
performed by A′ that we have described above, is perfectly indistinguishable with respect to the one described in
ExptA(k) of Definition 4.2. Therefore, we have shown that Prob(ExptA(k) = 1) ≤ ν(k) and the claim holds.
Complexity-theoretic assumptions. To conclude this proof we remark here that when using the variation of the
Σ -protocol of Blum discussed in Appendix B, we have that the Σ -protocol exists under the sole assumption that
one-way functions exist. Moreover, it is well known that one-time secure signature scheme can be constructed from
any one-way function [67]. 
Theorem 4.8. Given an NP-language L that admits an efficient Σ -protocol, then under the assumption that DSA is
a secure signature scheme and that the DDH assumption holds (or that the Cramer–Shoup signature scheme is secure
and that the DDH assumption holds) there exists an efficient three-round unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge
proof system in the common reference string model for L.
Proof. The proof follows the one of Theorem 4.7, however in this case we use the efficient hybrid simulation-
sound trapdoor commitment scheme that we have shown to exist in Theorem 3.7 under the same number-theoretic
assumptions as considered in the statement of this theorem. 
Hybrid multi-trapdoor commitments for simulation-sound zero-knowledge proofs. The approach used to
achieve simulation-sound zero-knowledge proofs from hybrid simulation-sound trapdoor commitments by using the
construction of [55] is quite general and can be used for simulation-sound zero-knowledge proofs from hybrid multi-
trapdoor commitments by using the construction of [44]. In the proof of Theorem 4.7 we have shown that by replacing
a (non-hybrid) simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme with a hybrid one, then an unbounded simulation-
sound zero-knowledge argument can be transformed into an unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof. This
same approach can be used for the case of (non-hybrid) multi-trapdoor commitment schemes and their application
to unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge arguments [44] (we stress that in [44] such a notion is referred to as
left-concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument). Since the improvement is based on the same techniques as
used for Theorem 4.7, we only discuss this case informally.
Consider the unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge argument of [44]. We require that the unbounded
adversarial prover runs the protocol by using some unconditionally binding commitment scheme such as the one
defined by the commitment parameters generated by algorithm HGen of a hybrid multi-trapdoor commitment scheme
HMTCS. As a consequence, the protocol resorts to the properties of the Σ -protocol and by using the variation of
Blum’s Σ -protocol presented in Appendix B we have that in the common reference string it is a proof (in contrast to
argument) and it can be based on the existence of one-way functions only. The simulator S for the zero-knowledge
property uses HTGen to generate the commitment parameters and uses the auxiliary information to equivocate the
commitments, precisely as discussed in the proof of Theorem 4.7 (i.e., the considered commitment scheme is a multi-
trapdoor commitment scheme instead of an unconditionally binding one).
Suppose that the commitment parameters are established by S, and a polynomial-time adversary A that mounts a
man-in-the-middle attack that violates the simulation-sound property. It is easy to verify that, in such a case, the proof
strictly follows the one of [44] and it can be shown that the existence ofA can be used to reach a contradiction (actually
in this scheme we have as additional assumption the existence of a family of collision-resistant hash functions) or to
show that a polynomial-time algorithm A′ that has oracle access to A can give the same argument system as given by
A without mounting the man-in-the-middle attack.
The following theorem follows from the above informal discussion and under the number-theoretic assumptions
discussed in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.9. Given an NP-language L that admits an efficient Σ -protocol, if collision-resistant hash functions
exist then under the sRSA and the DDH assumption or the sDH and the DDH assumptions there exists an
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efficient three-round unbounded simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof system in the common reference string model
for L.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have motivated and formalized the notion of hybrid trapdoor commitment. We have shown
different constructions based on the sole assumption that one-way functions exist and very efficient constructions
under number-theoretic assumptions.
For the main result of this paper, we have crucially used these commitments in order to achieve strong notions of
zero knowledge proofs (in contrast to arguments) that can be implemented either under weak complexity-theoretic
assumptions or efficiently under number-theoretic assumptions.
More recently, in [21,19] hybrid trapdoor commitments have been shown to imply mercurial commitments [22]
and thus are a building block for the construction of zero-knowledge sets [53].
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Appendix A. Some number theoretic assumptions
A.1. The strong RSA assumption
Let N = pq be the product of two primes. We denote by φ(N ) the Euler function of N ; it is a well known fact from
number theory that φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Let e be an integer relatively prime to φ(N ), the RSA assumption [66]
states that, given a random element y ∈ Z∗N , it is computationally infeasible to compute the unique x ∈ Z∗N such
that xe ≡ y mod N . The strong RSA assumption, introduced in [3], states that given a random element y as above, it
remains computationally infeasible to find a couple (x, e), with e 6= 1 such that xe ≡ y mod N . Thus the difference,
with respect to the standard RSA assumption, is that here the adversary is allowed to choose the exponent e for which
she will be able to compute the required root. More formally, denoting with RSA(k) the set of composite moduli, N
such that N is the product of two k/2-bit primes, we state that
Assumption A.1. We say that the strong RSA assumption holds if, for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries
A and for sufficiently large k one has
Pr[N ← RSA(k); y ← Z∗N ; (x, e)← A(N , y) : xe ≡ y mod N ]
is negligible in k.
A.2. The strong Diffie–Hellman assumption
Let G be a cyclic group of order q and let g be a generator of G. The strong DH assumption, introduced by [9],
states that no polynomially bounded adversary, on input G, g, gy, gy
2
, . . . , gy
`
, for some random secret y ∈ Zq ,
should be able to produce a couple (x, e) such that x y+e = g in G. More formally
Assumption A.2. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q, where |q| = k. We say that the strong `−DH assumption
holds in G if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A and for sufficiently large k one has that
Pr[y ← Zq; (x ∈ G, e ∈ Zq)← A(G, g, gy, gy2 , . . . , gy`) : x y+e = g]
is negligible in k.
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Appendix B. Tools
In this section we discuss some tools that we use in our constructions.
Naor’s commitment scheme. Given a pseudorandom generator G, the bit commitment scheme proposed by
Naor [57] works as follows. The receiver sends a 3k-bit string r to the sender. The sender randomly selects a k-
bit string s and commits to 0 by sending G(s), instead he commits to 1 by sending G(s)⊕ r . Finally the sender opens
the committed bit by sending s. Naor’s scheme has the following properties:
– Assumptions: it is based on the existence of pseudorandom generators; it is known how to construct them on the
assumptions that one-way functions exist [47].
– Round complexity: there exists a set-up stage in which the receiver sends one message, then the sender has to play
only one round for each commitment.
– Security: it is an unconditionally binding commitment scheme.
– Message distribution: both the set-up message of the receiver and the commitments computed by the sender are
indistinguishable from random strings for polynomial-time algorithms.
In the reference string model (in particular in the shared random string model) Naor’s commitment scheme can
be implemented as a non-interactive commitment scheme by replacing the set-up message sent by the receiver with a
piece of the reference string. Obviously, the bit commitment scheme can be extended to a string commitment scheme
by simply iterating the described scheme for each bit of the string.
Σ -protocols. A Σ -protocol is a three-round interactive protocol between two probabilistic algorithms, an honest
prover P and an honest verifier V . The algorithms receive as common input a statement “x ∈ L”. P has as auxiliary
input a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ RL where L is an NP-language and x belongs to L . At the end of the protocol
V decides whether the transcript is accepting with respect to the statement or not. Since a cheating prover P? can
interact with a verifier on input a false statement “x ∈ L”, we denote by L˜ the language of the instances (both true
and false) that can be used as common input with a verifier. Obviously it holds that L ⊆ L˜ .
The Σ -protocols we consider in this paper have the following properties:
– Public coin: V sends random bits only.
– Special soundness: let (a, c, z) and (a, c′, z′) be two accepting transcripts for a statement “x ∈ L”. If c 6= c′ then
x ∈ L (i.e., the statement is true) and there exists an efficient algorithm E , referred to as extractor, that on input
(x, a, c, z, c′, z′) outputs w such that (x, w) ∈ RL . Therefore we consider proofs (in contrast to arguments).
– Special honest-verifier zero knowledge: there is an efficient algorithm S, referred to as simulator, that on input
a true statement “x ∈ L” outputs for any c a pair (a, z) such that the triple (a, c, z) is indistinguishable from
the transcript of a conversation between P and V . Moreover, the triple (a, c, z) generated so far is an accepting
transcript independently of the truthfulness of the statement3 (i.e., it holds for any x ∈ L˜).
As a consequence of the properties described above, if x ∈ L˜ \ L then for any first message a there is only one pair
(c, z) such that (a, c, z) is an accepting transcript, therefore when the prover and the verifier run the protocol as input
a false statement, a can be used as a commitment and z as a decommitment of a commitment of string c.
There are in the literature many Σ -protocols with these properties, most notably, the protocol of Blum [7] that is
a Σ -protocol for the NP-complete language Hamiltonicity, the protocol of Schnorr [69] for proving knowledge of a
discrete logarithm and its variants (e.g., equality of discrete logarithms and other compositions by means of Boolean
formulae [24]).
In general we assume that the prover computes message z by using some auxiliary information generated during
the computation of message a.
Blum’s Σ -protocol for Hamiltonicity. In [7] Blum presented a Σ -protocol for the NP-complete language
Hamiltonicity. A variation of Blum’s Σ -protocol is instantiated on any one-way function by means of Naor’s
commitment scheme in the reference string model. This is achieved by first requiring that the reference string contains
3 This property is also required by the Σ protocols of [55].
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a string setup that corresponds to the message played by the receiver of Naor’s commitment scheme. Secondly,
for each proof the parties play the three rounds that we denote (a, c, z) of the original Blum’s Σ -protocol with the
following variation: the commitments encoded in message a are computed by using the second round of Naor’s
commitment scheme.
Auxiliary language. Given a commitment com and a message m, it is possible to reduce the decisional problem
“is com a commitment of a commitment of string m ?” to the decisional problem “is G a Hamiltonian graph ?” by
means of a general NP-reduction [23]. Therefore, we will assume that it is possible to use the previously discussed
implementation of Blum’s Σ -protocol to prove that a given commitment corresponds to a given string under the sole
assumption that one-way functions exist.
Σ -protocol for equality of two discrete logarithms. An efficient Σ -protocol for proving the equality of two
discrete logarithms can be achieved by means of an AND-composition of the Σ -protocol of Schnorr [69] for proving
knowledge of a discrete logarithm, in particular the prover uses the same random tape in the two cases (and the same
witness). More precisely, on input two generators g1, g2 ∈ G, and two values h1, h2 ∈ G one proves knowledge
of x = logg1 h1 = logg2 h2, by running two instances of the Schnorr protocol in parallel, using a common random
choice, a common challenge and a common response. For details, see [13].
Appendix C. Additional efficient implementations of hybrid trapdoor commitments
In this section we described two simple and efficient constructions of hybrid trapdoor commitments that achieve
also the extractability property. The constructions are based on the hardness of factoring and inverting RSA[N , N ]
(i.e., RSA where the public exponent is set to N ). In the following we focus on the basic notion of trapdoor
commitment, stronger properties (such as simulation soundness) can be achieved straightforwardly by applying the
techniques discussed in Section 3.
First, however we discuss an intractability assumption that is going to be used in our constructions.
Let N be the product of two k/2-bit safe primes (i.e., primes of the form p = 2p′ + 1 where p′ is prime). Let G
be the group of elements of order (λ(N )/2)N in Z∗N2 and G
′ the group of elements of order λ(N )/2 in Z∗N2 . Now
assume an element h is chosen uniformly and at random in G or in G ′ according to some random bit b. We consider
the following (decisional) problem. Given on input h and N (but not the factorization of the latter) guess b with
probability significantly better than 1/2. In what follows we will refer to this problem as to the Decisional Subgroup
Composite Residuosity problem (DSCR for brevity) and, for sufficiently large k, we assume it to be intractable.
The reader may have noticed that the conjecture sketched above looks very similar to the Decisional Composite
Residuosity (DCR) assumption suggested by Paillier [60]. Informally the DCR assumption states that, for sufficiently
large k, it is infeasible to distinguish N residues modulo N 2 (i.e., elements of the form z = xN mod N 2) from random
elements in Z∗N2 . Indeed, for the case of moduli obtained as the product of safe primes, the following lemma shows
that the two assumptions are actually equivalent.
Lemma C.1. Let N = pq be the product of two safe primes, then DCR is intractable if and only if DSCR is
intractable.
Proof. First observe that any adversary solving the DCR problem can be trivially used to break the DSCR problem.
Consequently we focus here on proving that the inverse direction holds as well.
Let A be an adversary for the DSCR problem, our goal is to construct an adversary A′ which receives on input a
random challenge for the DCR problem and “uses” A to solve it. In particular A′ receives on input h, N and has to
determine if it is an N -th residue or not. As a first step A′ computes c = h2 mod N 2 and if c = 1 it outputs yes. If
c 6= 1, A′ gives it to A and outputs whatever A outputs.
Let us denote by QRN2 the group of quadratic residues modulo N
2 and with QN RN2 the group of quadratic
residues which are also N -th residues in Z∗N2 . Now observe that c is a random element either in QRN2 or in QN RN2 .
In the first case the probability that c ∈ G is overwhelming (roughly 1 − 1/√N ). Similarly, if c ∈ QN RN2 , the
probability that c ∈ G ′ is overwhelming (roughly 1− 1/√λ(N )). Thus, skipping some simple details, it holds that
Prob[A′ succeeds] ≈ Prob[A succeeds]. 
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C.1. First construction
In this section we present a factoring-based construction which uses as a basic building block a trapdoor
commitment scheme proposed by Bresson et al. [12]. In the following we describe in detail the algorithms HGen,
HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer.
Key generation. The algorithm HTGen goes as follows. It takes as input the quantity 1k , where k is the usual security
parameter, and randomly chooses two random k/2-bit safe primes p, q and sets N = pq. Next, denoting with G the
cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo N 2, it chooses uniformly and at random an element h of maximal order in
G. Finally it outputs crs = 〈h, N 〉 and aux = 〈p, q〉.
The algorithm HGen is very similar to HTGen: the only difference is that here the algorithm chooses uniformly and
at random an element h′ in the subgroup G ′ – of G – of elements having order λ(N )/2. The output of HGen(1k) is
then crs′ = 〈h′, N 〉.
Notice that, assuming the DCR assumption holds, the two distributions according to which crs and crs′ are
generated are computationally indistinguishable.
Committing to a message. The algorithms HCom and HTCom are actually identical. To commit to a message m ∈ ZN
the sender chooses r ∈R ZN2 and sets
(com = hr (1+ mN ) mod N 2, dec = r) = HCom(crs′,m).
Algorithm HTCom has on input crs and aux instead of crs′ and m and performs the same computation of HCom by
using a randomly chosen m′.
As already proved by Bresson et al. [12], under the assumption that factoring large safe-prime moduli is hard,
HTGen, HTCom, HTDec, HVer is a trapdoor commitment scheme.
It remains to show that HGen, HCom, HVer is an unconditionally binding commitment scheme. First we prove that,
for any (m′, r ′), (m, r) such that
hr
′
(1+ m′N ) mod N 2 = hr (1+ mN ) mod N 2
it holds that m = m′ mod N 2. To see this observe that the equation above can be rewritten as
hr
′−r (1+ (m′ − m)N ) = 1 mod N 2. (1)
Now notice that h has order λ(N )/2 while 1+ (m′ −m)N has order N . Thus the only possibility for equation 1 to
be true is to have that r = r ′ mod λ(N )/2 and m = m′ mod N as required.
The hiding property, on the other hand, is implied by the DCR assumption.
C.2. An alternative construction based on RSA[N , N ]
Now we present a solution based on the hardness of inverting the RSA[N , N ] function. This construction builds on
(trapdoor) commitment scheme originally proposed by Catalano et al. [18]. Again, we describe in detail the algorithms
HGen, HTGen, HCom, HTCom, HTDec, HVer.
Key generation. The algorithm HTGen is as follows. It takes as input the quantity 1k , where k is the security
parameter, and randomly chooses two random k/2-bit safe primes p, q and sets N = pq. Next it chooses a random
element h ∈ Z∗N2 and outputs crs = 〈h, N 〉 and aux = 〈p, q〉.
The algorithm HGen looks very similar to HTGen: as before the only difference is in the choice of h. In this
case the algorithm chooses, uniformly and at random, an N -th residue h′ in Z∗N2 . The output of HGen(1
k) is then
crs′ = 〈h′, N 〉.
Once again, under the DCR assumption, the two distributions according to which crs and crs′ are generated are
computationally indistinguishable.
Committing to a message. Similarly to the construction presented in the previous section, the algorithms HCom and
HTCom are actually the same. To commit to a message m ∈ ZN the sender chooses r ∈R Z∗N , s ∈ ZN and sets
(com = (1+ mN )r Nhs mod N 2, dec = (r, s)) = HCom(crs,m).
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Algorithm HTCom has on input crs and aux instead of crs′ and m and performs the same computation of HCom by
using a randomly chosen m′.
In [18] Catalano et al. proved that, under the assumption that inverting RSA with public exponent set to N is hard,
HTGen, HTCom, HTDec, HVer is a trapdoor commitment scheme.
It remains to prove that HGen, HCom, HVer is an unconditionally binding commitment scheme. However this follows
immediately from the fact that, when h is chosen as a random N -th residue in Z∗N2 , our commitment scheme actually
becomes Paillier’s encryption scheme with public base g = (1+ N ).
Appendix D. Multi-trapdoor commitments and signature schemes
In this section we clarify the relationship between multi-trapdoor commitment schemes and signature schemes.
In particular we show that multi-trapdoor commitment schemes are actually equivalent to signature schemes secure
against generic chosen message attack (for brevity we will refer to this class of signature schemes as weak signatures).
In a nutshell in a generic chosen message attack the adversary is allowed to obtain (from the signer S) valid signatures
for a chosen list of messages m1 . . .m` before trying to produce a forgery. More precisely, in this scenario, we allow
the adversary to choose the messages but only in a generic way, meaning with this that the list of messages is chosen
before S’s public key is revealed (and thus the attack is generic in the sense that it does not depend on the specific
public key).
We prove the equivalence between the two primitives by showing how to construct a multi-trapdoor commitment
scheme from any weak signature scheme and vice versa.
D.1. Multi-trapdoor commitments based on weak signatures
Here we show how to construct a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme from any weak signature scheme. Our basic
construction is not completely new in the sense that we adapt to our case a reduction method previously proposed by
Canetti et al. [17] and by MacKenzie and Yang [55]. Thus before going into the details of the reduction we briefly
discuss the specific tools we need.
1. We use the Naor [57] commitment scheme based on pseudorandom generators. Pseudorandom generators can be
constructed from any one-way function [47]. One-way functions are equivalent to secure signatures (and therefore
are also equivalent to weak signatures).
2. A parameter LPKi is included. Intuitively LPKi is the i-th (public) key for the multi-trapdoor commitment scheme
we are about to construct.
3. As underlying NP language we consider the verification relation
{((VK,LPKi ), σi ) | Verify((VK,LPKi ), σi ) = 1}
where VK is the verification key for the given weak signature scheme and Verify is the signature verification
algorithm. Intuitively a local trapdoor for the scheme we have in mind is just a signature σi (with respect to the
public key VK) of the local public key LPKi .
The multi-trapdoor commitment scheme goes as follows. Gen (on input 1k) generates a pair of matching signing
and verification keys MSK and MVK for a weak signature scheme. Next it generates a set LS which is the space from
which local public keys are sampled (in particular we assume that the statement “x ∈ LS” is efficiently verifiable).
Gen outputs the public key MPK = (MVK, LS).
The algorithm Sel on input MPK outputs some element in LS that we denote LPKi .
Tkg on input LPKi and MSK checks that LPKi ∈ LS and, if yes, produces a signature σi on LPKi . Tkg outputs σi as
local trapdoor.
To commit to a bit b, Com((MPK,LPKi ), b) uses the NP relation
{(MPK,LPKi ) | ∃σi : Verify((MPK,LPKi ), σi ) = 1}
and produces an NP-reduction from this relation to the Hamiltonicity relation for a graph G, having q nodes, so that
finding a Hamiltonian cycle in G is equivalent to computing σi . Then it proceeds as follows.
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• To commit to 0, pick a random permutation pi of the graph G and commit to the entries of the adjacency matrix one
by one, using the underlying commitment scheme based on pseudorandom generators. To decommit, just release
pi and decommit to every entry of the adjacency matrix.
• To commit to 1, choose a randomly labelled q-cycle in the graph and commit to all the entries in the adjacency
matrix which correspond to edges of the q-cycle. For the remaining entries just provide random values (in the
appropriate range). To decommit open only the entries corresponding to the randomly chosen q-cycle.
The algorithm TCom on input ((MPK,LPKi ), σi ) computes the graph G associated with (MPK,LPKi ) and using σi
finds a Hamiltonian cycle HG(G) in G. It then selects a random permutation pi of the nodes of G and, using Com,
commits to all the entries of the adjacency matrix of pi(G) one by one. Finally it sets ω = (G, HG(G)).
TDec on input ω a commitment com and a bit b goes as follows. If b = 0 then it decommits using the decommitment
of zero. If b = 1 it decommits via the decommitment procedure for 1, using HG(G) as underlying Hamiltonian cycle.
It remains to show that if we have an adversary A that can break the binding property of the scheme presented
above then we can use this adversary to implement an adversary B (whose running time is polynomially related to
that of A) that breaks the weak signature scheme.
First of all B receives as input a message space M. It sets LS = M and forwards this information to A. A
proceeds by choosing ` public keys (for some parameter `) pk1 . . . pk`. Next B sets m1 = pk1, . . . ,m` = pk` as
its own list of candidate messages to be signed. Note that once B receives the signatures (σ1, . . . , σ`) for the selected
messages, it can easily equivocate on every pki (for i = 1, . . . , `). This is because for each public key in the list it
knows the corresponding (local) private key. Now assume A manages to output a triple (com, dec, dec′) such that
Ver((MPK, pk), com, dec,m) = Ver((MPK, pk), com, dec′,m′) = 1 where m 6= m′ and pk 6= pki for i = 1, . . . , `.
In such a case, however, B can use this double opening to extract a Hamiltonian cycle in G and thus a signature on
the (previously unasked) message m = pk, which means that B can break the weak signature scheme.
D.2. Weak signatures from multi-trapdoor commitments
Here we show the converse direction, namely how to construct a weak signature scheme out of a multi-trapdoor
commitment scheme. The basic idea of this construction is to set, as message space for the signature scheme, the
public key space of the multi-trapdoor commitment scheme. Then to sign a message M one shows the ability to open
a commitment with public key M to both zero and one. In detail the construction goes as follows. Let MTC be the given
multi-trapdoor commitment scheme. We define SigMTC = (SigGenMTC, SignMTC, VerifyMTC) as follows.
• On input 1k , SigGenMTC runs Gen(1k) and obtains back as output (MPK, MSK) together with a public key space LS.
Then SigGenMTC sets V K = MPK and SK = MSK andM = LS (where byM we mean the message space).
• On input the signing key SK and a message m, SignMTC first checks if m ∈M and, if yes, it runs
tk← Tkg(SK ,m), (C, ω)← TCom(tk)
and
y0← TDec(ω, 0) y1← TDec(ω, 1)
The signature is then σ = (C, y0, y1).
• To verify a signature for a message m ∈M, one just checks that the following equalities Ver(m,C, y0, 0) = 1 and
Ver(m,C, y1, 1) = 1 are satisfied.
Theorem D.1. Let MTC be a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme then SigMTC is a signature scheme that is
existentially unforgeable against generic chosen message attack.
Proof. To prove the statement we assume there exists an adversaryA for SigMTC and then we show how to construct
an attacker B which “uses” A to break the binding property of the underlying multi-trapdoor commitment scheme
MTC. When B receives the public key space LS for MTC, it sets M = LS and forwards this information to A. At
some point A sends to B a list of messages m1,m2, . . . ,m` for which it would like to have a signature. B then, sets
pk1 = m1, . . . , pk` = m` as the list of public keys to submit to the equivocation oracle E . Then when B receives
the public key MPK for the multi-trapdoor commitment scheme it sets PK = MPK as the public key for the signature
scheme and sends this information to A.
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Next B simulates the signing oracle by simply asking E to generate commitments and decommitments for the
pki ’s selected previously. Now if we assume that A can break the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme,
this means that, with some non-negligible probability A will be able to generate a signature σ for a message
m ∈ M not in the list it previously submitted. In particular σ will be a triplet of the form (C, y0, y1) such that
Ver(MPK,C,m, y0, 0) = Ver(MPK,C,m, y1, 1) and pk = m was not previously used in any query to E . This, clearly,
leads to a contradiction. 
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